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Abstract
The literature assessing whether mutual fund managers have skill typically regards skill
as an immutable attribute of the manager or the fund. Yet, many measures of skill, such
as returns, alphas, and measures of stock-picking and market-timing, appear to vary
over the business cycle. Because time-varying ability seems far-fetched, these results
call into question the existence of skill itself. This paper oers a rational explanation,
arguing that skill is a general cognitive ability that can be applied to dierent tasks,
such as picking stocks or market timing. Using tools from the rational inattention
literature, we show that the relative value of these tasks varies cyclically. The model
generates indirect predictions for the dispersion and returns of fund portfolios that
distinguish this explanation from others and which are supported by the data. In
turn, these ndings oer useful evidence to support the notion of rational attention
allocation.
\What information consumes is rather obvious: It consumes the attention of its re-
cipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention, and a need
to allocate that attention eciently among the overabundance of information sources
that might consume it." Simon (1971)
The literature that evaluates skills of mutual fund managers typically regards skill as an
immutable attribute of the manager or the fund.1 Yet, many skill measures vary over the
business cycle, such as returns, alphas (Glode 2011), and measures of stock-picking and
market-timing (Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp 2011) (hereafter \KVV").
Because time-varying ability seems far-fetched, these results call into question the existence
of skill itself. This paper examines a rational explanation for time-varying skill, where skill
is a general cognitive ability that can be applied to dierent tasks, such as picking stocks or
market timing, at dierent points in time. Each period, skilled managers choose how much
of their time or cognitive ability (call that \attention") to allocate to each task. When the
economic environment changes, the relative payos of paying attention to market timing and
stock selection shift. The resulting uctuations in attention allocation look like time-varying
skill. While this story might sound plausible, it leaves open three questions. First, why
would a manager want his attention allocation to depend on the state of the business cycle?
Second, do the manager's attention choices exhibit the same pattern as the time-varying
skill observed in the data? If managers want to allocate more attention to stock-picking
in booms, do we see better stock picking in booms? Third, if there are many skilled and
unskilled managers in an asset market, would the time-series and cross-sectional portfolio and
return patterns resemble those in the data? This paper builds a simple theory of attention
allocation and portfolio choice and subjects it to these three tests.
The model uses tools from the rational inattention literature (Sims 2003) to analyze
the trade-o between allocating attention to each task. In recessions, the abundance of
aggregate risk and its high price both work in the same direction to make market timing
more valuable. The model generates indirect predictions for the dispersion and returns
of fund portfolios that distinguish this explanation from other potential explanations for
time-varying skill. It reveals that when skilled managers devote more time to market timing,
portfolio dispersion is higher, both among skilled managers and between skilled and unskilled
1For theoretical models, see e.g., Mamaysky and Spiegel (2002), Berk and Green (2004), Kaniel and
Kondor (2010), Cuoco and Kaniel (2010), Vayanos and Woolley (2010), Chien, Cole, and Lustig (2010),
Chapman, Evans, and Xu (2010), and Pastor and Stambaugh (2010). A number of recent papers in the
empirical mutual fund literature also nd that some managers have skill, e.g., Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng
(2005, 2008), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011),
Koijen (2010), and Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2010).
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managers. It predicts that recessions are times when skilled managers outperform others by
a larger margin. Finally, it predicts that volatility and recessions should each have an
independent eect on attention, dispersion, and performance. All of these predictions are
borne out in the mutual fund data.
These ndings oer useful evidence to support a variety of theories that use rational
attention allocation to explain phenomena in many economic environments. Recent work
has shown that introducing attention constraints into decision problems can help explain ob-
served consumption, price-setting, and investment patterns as well as the timing of govern-
ment announcements and the propensity for governments to be unprepared for rare events.2
An obstacle to the progress of this line of work is that information is not directly observable,
precluding a direct test of whether decision makers actually allocate their attention in a
value-maximizing way. While papers such as Klenow and Willis (2007), Mondria, Wu, and
Zhang (2010) and Mackowiak, Moench, and Wiederholt (2009) have also tested predictions
of rational inattention models, none has looked for evidence that attention is reallocated,
arguably a more stringent test of the theory.
To surmount the problem that attention is unobservable, our model uses an observable
variable { the state of the business cycle { to predict attention allocation. Attention, in turn,
predicts aggregate investment patterns. Because the theory begins and ends with observable
variables, it becomes testable. To carry out these tests, we use data on actively managed
equity mutual funds. A wealth of detailed data on portfolio holdings and returns makes
this industry an ideal setting in which to test whether decision makers allocate attention
optimally.
To explore whether a rational attention allocation can explain the behavior of mutual
fund managers, we build a general equilibrium model in which a fraction of investment
managers have skill. These skilled managers can observe a xed number of signals about
asset payos and choose what fraction of those signals will contain aggregate versus stock-
specic information. We think of aggregate signals as macroeconomic data that aect future
cash ows of all rms, and of stock-specic signals as rm-level data that forecast the part of
rms' future cash ows that is independent of the aggregate shocks. Based on their signals,
skilled managers form portfolios, choosing larger portfolio weights for assets that are more
2See, for example, Sims (2003) on consumption, Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009a, 2009b), and Matejka
(2011) on price setting, and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009, 2010) and Kondor (2009) on nancial
investment. Reis (2011) considers the optimal timing of government announcements and Mackowiak and
Wiederholt (2011) use rational inattention constraint to model the allocation of cognitive energy to planning
for rare events. A related attention constraint called inattentiveness is explored in Reis (2006). Veldkamp
(2011) provides a survey of this literature.
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likely to have high returns.
The model produces four main predictions. The rst prediction is that attention should
be reallocated over the business cycle. In the data, recessions are times when unexpected
returns are low, aggregate volatility rises, and the price of risk surges. When we embed
these three forces in our model, the rst has little eect on attention allocation, but the
second and third forces both draw attention to aggregate shocks in recessions. The increased
volatility of aggregate shocks makes it optimal to allocate more attention to them, because
it is more valuable to pay attention to more uncertain outcomes. The elevated price of risk
amplies this reallocation: Since aggregate shocks aect a large fraction of the portfolio's
value, paying attention to aggregate shocks resolves more portfolio risk than learning about
stock-specic risks. When the price of risk is high, such risk-minimizing attention choices
become more valuable. While the idea that it is more valuable to shift attention to more
volatile shocks may not be all that surprising, whether changes in the price of risk would
amplify or counteract this eect is not obvious.
The second and third predictions do not come from the reallocation of attention. Rather,
they help to distinguish this theory from non-informational alternatives and support the idea
that at least some portfolio managers are engaging in value-maximizing behavior. The sec-
ond prediction is counter-cyclical dispersion in portfolio holdings and prots. In recessions,
when aggregate shocks to asset payos are larger in magnitude, asset payos exhibit more co-
movement. Thus, any portfolio strategies that put exogenously xed weights on assets would
have returns that also comove more in recessions. In contrast, when investment managers
learn about asset payos and manage their portfolios according to what they learn, fund
returns comove less in recessions. The reason is that when aggregate shocks become more
volatile, managers who learn about aggregate shocks put less weight on their common prior
beliefs, which have less predictive power, and more weight on their heterogeneous signals.
This generates more heterogeneous beliefs in recessions and therefore more heterogeneous
investment strategies and fund returns.
Third, the model predicts time variation in fund performance. Since the average fund
can only outperform the market if there are other, non-fund investors who underperform, the
model also includes unskilled non-fund investors. Because asset payos are more uncertain,
recessions are times when information is more valuable. Therefore, the informational ad-
vantage of the skilled over the unskilled increases and generates higher returns for informed
managers. The average fund's outperformance rises.
The fourth prediction is perhaps the most specic to our theory. It argues that all three
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of the above eects of recessions come in part from high aggregate volatility, and in part
from the high price of risk. Therefore, periods of high aggregate volatility should be periods
in which attention is allocated to aggregate shocks, portfolio dispersion is high, and skilled
funds outperform. Then, after controlling for volatility, there should also be an additional
positive eect of recessions on all three measures. This additional eect comes from the fact
that recessions are also times when the price of risk is high. In other words, both volatility
and the price of risk have separate eects on skill, dispersion, and performance.
We test the model's four main predictions on the universe of actively managed U.S.
mutual funds. To test the rst prediction, a key insight is that managers can only choose
portfolios that covary with shocks they pay attention to. Thus, to detect cyclical changes
in attention, we should look for changes in covariances. KVV does precisely this. They
estimate the covariance of each fund's portfolio holdings with the aggregate payo shock,
proxied by innovations in industrial production growth. This covariance measures a man-
ager's ability to time the market by increasing (decreasing) her portfolio positions in antici-
pation of good (bad) macroeconomic news. This timing covariance rises in recessions. KVV
also calculate the covariance of a fund's portfolio holdings with asset-specic shocks, prox-
ied by innovations in earnings. This covariance measures managers' ability to pick stocks
that subsequently experience unexpectedly high earnings. Consistent with the theory, this
stock-picking covariance increases in expansions.
Second, we test for cyclical changes in portfolio dispersion. We nd that, in recessions,
funds hold portfolios that dier more from one another. As a result, their cross-sectional
return dispersion increases, consistent with the theory. In the model, much of this dispersion
comes from taking dierent bets on market outcomes, which should show up as dispersion
in CAPM betas. We indeed nd evidence in the data for higher beta dispersion in recessions
as well.
Third, we document fund outperformance in recessions.3 Risk-adjusted excess fund re-
turns (alphas) are around 1.8 to 2.4% per year higher in recessions, depending on the spec-
ication. Gross alphas (before fees) are not statistically dierent from zero in expansions,
but they are positive (2.1%) in recessions.4 These cyclical dierences are statistically and
3Empirical work by Moskowitz (2000), Kosowski (2006), Lynch and Wachter (2007), and Glode (2011)
also documents such evidence, but their focus is solely on performance, not on managers' attention allocation
nor their investment strategies. Furthermore, these studies are silent on the specic mechanism that drives
the outperformance result, which is one of the main contributions of our paper.
4Net alphas (after fees) are negative in expansions (-0.9%) and positive (1.0%) in recessions. Since funds
do not set fees in our model, we have no predictions about after-fee alphas. For a theory about why we
should expect net alphas to be zero, see Berk and Green (2004).
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economically signicant.
Fourth, we document an eect of recessions on covariance, dispersion, and performance,
above and beyond that which comes from volatility alone. When we use both a recession
indicator and aggregate volatility as explanatory variables, we nd that both contribute
about equally to our three main results. Showing that these results are truly business-cycle
phenomena { as opposed to merely high volatility phenomena { is interesting because it
connects these results with the existing macroeconomics literature on rational inattention,
e.g., Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009a, 2009b).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out our model. After
describing the setup, we characterize the optimal information and investment choices of
skilled and unskilled investors. We show how equilibrium asset prices are formed. We derive
theoretical predictions for funds' attention allocation, portfolio dispersion, and performance.
Section 2 tests the model's predictions using the context of actively managed mutual funds.
Section 3 discusses alternative explanations. We conclude that while a handful of theories
could explain one or two of the facts we document, few, if any, alternatives would explain
why covariance, dispersion, and performance all vary both with macroeconomic volatility
and with recessions.
1 Model
We develop a stylized model whose purpose is to understand how the optimal attention
allocation of investment managers depends on the business cycle and how attention aects
asset holdings and asset prices. Most of the complexity of the model comes from the fact
that it is an equilibrium model. But in order to study the eects of attention on asset
holdings, asset prices and fund performance, having an equilibrium model is a necessity.
The equilibrium model makes it clear that, while investors might all pay more attention to
a particular asset, they cannot all hold more of that asset, because the market must clear.
Similarly, an equilibrium model ensures that for every investor that outperforms, there is
someone who underperforms as well.
1.1 Setup
We consider a three-period model. At time 1, skilled investment managers choose how to
allocate their attention across aggregate and asset-specic shocks. At time 2, all investors
choose their portfolios of risky and riskless assets. At time 3, asset payos and utility are
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realized. Since this is a static model, the investment world is either in the recession (R) or
in the expansion state (E).5
Assets The model features three assets. Assets 1 and 2 have random payos f with
respective loadings b1; b2 on an aggregate shock a, and face stock-specic shocks s1; s2. The
third asset, c, is a composite asset. Its payo has no stock-specic shock and a loading of
one on the aggregate shock. We use this composite asset as a stand-in for all other assets to
avoid the curse of dimensionality in the optimal attention allocation problem. Formally,
fi = i + bia+ si; i 2 f1; 2g
fc = c + a
where the shocks a  N(0; a) and si  N(0; i), for i 2 f1; 2g. At time 1, the distribution of
payos is common knowledge; all investors have common priors about payos f  N(;).
Let E1, V1 denote expectations and variances conditioned on this information. Specically,
E1[fi] = i. The prior covariance matrix of the payos, , has the following entries: ii =
b2ia + i and ij = bibja. In matrix notation:
 = bb0a +
264 1 0 00 2 0
0 0 0
375
where the vector b is dened as b = [b1 b2 1]
0. In addition to the three risky assets, there
exists a risk-free asset that pays a net return, r.
Investors We consider a continuum of atomless investors. In the model, the only ex-ante
dierence between investors is that a fraction  of them have skill, meaning that they can
choose to observe a set of informative signals about the payo shocks a or si. We call these
investors skilled mutual funds and describe their signal choice problem below. The remaining
unskilled investors observe no information other than their prior beliefs.
Some of the unskilled investors are mutual fund managers. As in reality, there are also
5We do not consider transitions between recessions and expansions, although such an extension would be
easy in our setting because assets are short lived and their payos are realized and known to all investors
at the end of each period. Thus, a dynamic model would amount to a succession of static models that are
either in the expansion or in the recession state.
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non-fund investors. We assume that they are unskilled.6 The reason for modeling non-
fund investors is that without them, the sum of all funds' holdings would have to equal the
market (market clearing) and therefore, the average fund return would have to equal the
market return. There could be no excess return in expansions or recessions.
Bayesian Updating At time 2, each skilled investment manager observes signal realiza-
tions. Signals are random draws from a distribution that is centered around the true payo
shock, with a variance equal to the inverse of the signal precision that was chosen at time
1. Thus, skilled manager j's signals are aj = a + eaj, 1j = s1 + e1j, and 2j = s2 + e2j,
where eaj  N(0; K 1aj ), e1j  N(0; K 11j ), and e2j  N(0; K 12j ) are independent of each
other and across fund managers. Managers combine signal realizations with priors to update
their beliefs, using Bayes' law.
Of course, asset prices contain payo-relevant information as well. Lemma 2 in Appendix
A establishes that managers always prefer to process additional private signals, rather than
to use the same amount of capacity to process the information in prices. Therefore, we model
managers as if they observed prices, but did not exert the mental eort required to infer the
payo-relevant signals.7
Since the resulting posterior beliefs (conditional on time-2 information) are such that
payos are normally distributed, they can be fully described by posterior means, (a^j; s^ij),
and variances, (^aj; ^ij). More precisely, posterior precisions are the sum of prior and signal
precisions: ^ 1aj = 
 1
a + Kaj and ^
 1
ij = 
 1
i + Kij. The posterior means of the stock-
specic shocks, s^ij, are a precision-weighted linear combination of the prior belief that si = 0
and the signal i: s^ij = Kijij=(Kij + 
 1
i ). Simplifying yields s^ij = (1   ^ij 1i )ij and
a^j = (1   ^aj 1a )aj. Next, we convert posterior beliefs about the underlying shocks into
posterior beliefs about the asset payos. Let ^j be the posterior variance-covariance matrix
of payos f :
^j = bb
0^aj +
264 ^1j 0 00 ^2j 0
0 0 0
375
6For our results, it is sucient to assume that the fraction of non-fund investors that are unskilled is
higher than that for the investment managers (funds).
7We could allow managers to infer this information and subtract the amount of attention required to
infer this information from their total attention endowment. That would not change the basic result that
investors prefer to learn more about more volatile risks (see Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009)).
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Likewise, let ^j be the 3 1 vector of posterior expected payos:
^j = [1 + b1a^j + s^1j; 2 + b2a^j + s^2j; c + a^j]
0 (1)
For any unskilled manager or investor: ^j =  and ^j = .
Modeling recessions The asset pricing literature identies three principal eects of re-
cessions: (1) returns are unexpectedly low, (2) returns are more volatile, and (3) the price of
risk is high. Section 2.2 discusses the empirical evidence supporting the latter two eects. To
capture the return volatility eect (2) in the model, we assume that the prior variance of the
aggregate shock in recessions (R) is higher than the one in expansions (E): a(R) > a(E).
To capture the varying price of risk (3), we vary the parameter that governs the price of
risk, which is risk aversion. We assume (R) > (E). We continue to use a and  to denote
aggregate shock variance and risk aversion in the current business cycle state.
The rst eect of recessions, unexpectedly low returns, cannot aect attention allocation
because attention must be allocated before returns are observed. Yet, unexpected returns
could aect managers' return covariances. The diculty in analyzing this eect is that since
agents in our model always know the current state of the business cycle, they cannot be
systematically surprised by low asset payos in recessions. When low payos are expected,
asset prices fall, leaving returns unaected. Therefore, exploring (1) requires a slightly
modied model that relaxes rational expectations. The Supplementary Appendix explores
this model numerically and shows that the unexpectedly low returns have little eect on the
results.8 The main body of the paper explores the volatility and price of risk eects.
Portfolio Choice Problem We solve this model by backward induction. We rst solve
for the optimal portfolio choice at time 2 and substitute in that solution into the time-1
optimal attention allocation problem.
Investors are each endowed with initial wealth,W0. They have mean-variance preferences
over time-3 wealth, with a risk-aversion coecient, . Let E2 and V2 denote expectations
and variances conditioned on all information known at time 2. Thus, investor j chooses qj
to maximize time-2 expected utility, U2j:
U2j = E2[Wj]  
2
2
V2[Wj] (2)
8The supplementary appendix is a separate document, not intended for publication.
8
subject to the budget constraint:
Wj = rW0 + q
0
j(f   pr:) (3)
Since there are no wealth eects with exponential utility, we normalize W0 to zero for the
theoretical results. After having received the signals and having observed the prices of the
risky assets, p, the investment manager chooses risky asset holdings, qj, where p and qj are
3-by-1 vectors.
Asset Prices Equilibrium asset prices are determined by market clearing:Z
qjdj = x+ x; (4)
where the left-hand side of the equation is the vector of aggregate demand and the right-
hand side is the vector of aggregate supply. As in the standard noisy rational expectations
equilibrium model, the asset supply is random to prevent the price from fully revealing the
information of informed investors. We denote the 3 1 noisy asset supply vector by x+ x,
with a random component x  N(0; xI).
Attention Allocation Problem At time 1, a skilled investment manager j chooses the
precisions of signals about the payo-relevant shocks a, s1, or s2 that she will receive at
time 2. We denote these signal precisions by Kaj, K1j, and K2j, respectively. These choices
maximize time-1 expected utility, U1j, over the fund's terminal wealth:
U1j = E1

E2[Wj]  
2
2
V2[Wj]

; (5)
subject to two constraints.
The rst constraint is the information capacity constraint. It states that the sum of the
signal precisions must not exceed the information capacity:
K1j +K2j +Kaj  K: (6)
Note that our model holds each manager's total attention xed and studies its allocation in
recessions and expansions. In Section 1.9, we allow a manager to choose how much capacity
for attention to acquire.
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Unskilled investors have no information capacity, K = 0. In Bayesian updating with
normal variables, observing one signal with precision  1 or two signals, each with precision
 1=2, is equivalent. Therefore, one interpretation of the capacity constraint is that it
allows the manager to observe N signal draws, each with precision K=N , for large N . The
investment manager then chooses how many of those N signals will be about each shock.9
The second constraint is the no-forgetting constraint, which ensures that the chosen
precisions are non-negative:
K1j  0 K2j  0 Kaj  0: (7)
It prevents the manager from erasing any prior information, to make room to gather new
information about another shock.
1.2 Model Solution
Substituting the budget constraint (3) into the objective function (2) and taking the rst-
order condition with respect to qj reveals that optimal holdings are increasing in the investor's
risk tolerance, precision of beliefs, and expected return on the assets:
qj =
1

^ 1j (^j   pr): (8)
Since uninformed fund managers and non-fund investors have identical beliefs, ^j =  and
^j = , they hold identical portfolios 
 1 1(  pr).
Using the market-clearing condition (4), equilibrium asset prices are linear in payos and
supply shocks. We derive the linear coecients A, B and C such that:
Lemma 1. p = 1
r
(A+Bf + Cx)
A detailed derivation of expected utility and the proofs of this and all further propositions
are in Appendix A.
Substituting optimal risky asset holdings from equation (8) into the rst-period objective
function (5) yields: U1j =
1
2
E1
h
(^j   pr)^ 1j (^j   pr)
i
. Because asset prices are linear
functions of normally distributed payos and asset supplies, expected excess returns, ^j pr,
9The results are not sensitive to the additive nature of the information capacity constraint. They also
hold, for example, for a product constraint on precisions. The entropy constraints often used in information
theory take this multiplicative form. Results available upon request.
10
are normally distributed as well. Therefore, (^j   pr)^ 1j (^j   pr) is a non-central 2-
distributed variable, with mean10
U1j =
1
2
trace(^ 1j V1[^j   pr]) +
1
2
E1[^j   pr]0^ 1j E1[^j   pr]: (9)
1.3 Bringing Model to Data
The following sections explain the model's four key predictions: attention allocation, dis-
persion in investors' portfolios, average performance, and the eect of recessions on these
objects beyond that of aggregate volatility. For each prediction, we state a hypothesis and
explain how we test it.
Our empirical measures use conventional denitions of asset returns, portfolio returns,
and portfolio weights. Risky asset returns are dened asRi  fi
pi
 1, for i 2 f1; 2; cg, while the
risk-free asset return is R0  1+r
1
 1 = r. We dene the market return as the value-weighted
average of the individual asset returns: Rm Pi2f1;2;cgwmi Ri, where wmi  piqiP
k2f1;2;cg pkqk
and
qi 
R
j
qji is the total demand for asset j. Likewise, a fund j's return is R
j Pi2f0;1;2;cgwjiRi,
where wji  piq
j
iP
k2f0;1;2;cg pkq
j
k
. It follows that end-of-period wealth (assets under management)
equals beginning-of-period wealth times the fund return: W j = W j0 (1 +R
j).
1.4 Prediction 1: Cyclical Attention Re-allocation
First, we derive from the model the prediction that the optimal attention allocation in
expansions diers from that in recessions. Specically, there should be more attention paid to
aggregate shocks in recessions and more attention paid to stock-specic shocks in expansions.
Recessions involve changes in the volatility of aggregate shocks and changes in the price of
risk. In order to see the eect of each aspect of a recession, we consider each separately,
beginning with the rise in volatility.
In the model, each skilled manager (K > 0) solves for the choice of signal precisions
Kaj  0 and K1j  0 that maximize her time-1 expected utility (9). The choice of signal
precision K2j  0 is implied by the capacity constraint (6). A rst prediction of our model is
that it becomes relatively more valuable to learn about the aggregate shock, a, in recessions.
10If z  N(E[z]; V ar[z]), then E[z0z] = trace(V ar[z]) + E[z]0E[z], where trace is the matrix trace (the
sum of its diagonal elements). Setting z = ^
 1=2
j (^j   pr) delivers the result.
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Proposition 1. If price noise (x) is suciently large (condition (42) holds), then the
marginal value of a given skilled investor j reallocating an increment of capacity from stock-
specic shock i 2 f1; 2g to the aggregate shock is increasing in the aggregate shock variance:
If Kaj = ~K and Kij = K   ~K, then @2U=@ ~K@a > 0.
Intuitively, in most learning problems, investors prefer to learn about large shocks that are
an important component of the overall asset supply, and volatile shocks that have high prior
payo variance. Aggregate shocks are larger in scale, but are less volatile than stock-specic
shocks. Recessions are times when aggregate volatility increases, which makes aggregate
shocks more valuable to learn about. The converse is true in expansions. Note that this is
a partial derivative result. It holds information choices xed. In any interior equilibrium,
attention will be reallocated until the marginal utility of learning about aggregate and stock-
specic shocks is equalized. But it is the initial increase in marginal utility which drives this
re-allocation.
It would seem logical that learning about aggregate shocks should always be more valuable
in times when those shocks are more volatile. But working through the theory teaches us
that this is not true under all circumstances. When the parameter restriction (condition
(42)) is violated, more aggregate payo risk (higher a) creates less risk in expected returns
(lower V ar[f   pr]). This is possible when prices are very good at aggregating information
(low x), when many agents acquire lots of information about the aggregate shock (high
Ka), and when risk aversion is low. This is a sucient but not a necessary condition for
many of our results to hold. In our numerical work, when we choose parameter values that
replicate the observed volatility of aggregate stock market returns and simulate the model,
(42) is always easily satised.
Next, we consider the eect of an increase in the price of risk. The following result shows
that the increase in the price of risk induces managers to allocate even more attention to the
aggregate shock in recessions. The additional price of risk eect should show up as an eect
of recessions, above and beyond what aggregate volatility alone can explain. The parameter
that governs the price of risk in our model is risk aversion. The following result shows that
an increase in the price of risk (risk aversion) in recessions is an independent force driving
the reallocation of attention from stock-specic to aggregate shocks.
Proposition 2. If the size of the composite asset xc is suciently large, then an increase
in risk aversion increases the marginal utility of reallocating a unit of capacity from the
rm-specic shock to the aggregate shock: @2U=@@(Kaj  K1j)) > 0.
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The intuition for this result is that the aggregate shock aects a large fraction of the value
of one's portfolio. Therefore, a marginal reduction in the uncertainty about an aggregate
shock reduces total portfolio risk by more than the same-sized reduction in the uncertainty
about a stock-specic shock. In other words, learning about the aggregate shock is the most
ecient way to reduce portfolio risk. The more risk averse an agent is, the more attractive
aggregate attention allocation becomes.
As long as the investor's capacity allocation choice is not a corner solution (Kaj 6= 0
or Kaj 6= K), a rise in the marginal utility of aggregate shock information increases the
optimal Kaj. In these environments, skilled investment managers allocate a relatively larger
fraction of their attention to learning about the aggregate shock in recessions. But, that
eect can break down when assets become very asymmetric because corner solutions arise.
For example, if the average supply of the composite asset, xc, is too large relative to the
supply of the individual asset supplies, x1 and x2, the aggregate shock will be so valuable to
learn about that all skilled managers will want to learn about it exclusively (Kaj = K) in
expansions and recessions. Similarly, if the aggregate volatility, a, is too low, then nobody
ever learns about the aggregate shock (Kaj = 0 always).
Investors' optimal attention allocation decisions are reected in their portfolio holdings.
In recessions, skilled investors predominantly allocate attention to the aggregate payo shock,
a. They use the information they observe to form a portfolio that covaries with a. In times
when they learn that a will be high, they hold more risky assets whose returns are increasing
in a. This positive covariance can be seen from equation (8) in which q is increasing in ^j
and from equation (1) in which ^j is increasing in a^j, which is further increasing in a. The
positive covariances between the aggregate shock and funds' portfolio holdings in recessions,
on the one hand, and between stock-specic shocks and the portfolio holdings in expansions,
on the other hand, directly follow from optimal attention allocation decisions switching over
the business cycle. As such, these covariances are the key moments that enable us to test
the attention allocation predictions of the model.
Following KVV, we dene a fund's fundamentals-based timing ability, Ftiming, as the
covariance between its portfolio weights in deviation from the market portfolio weights,
wji  wmi , and the aggregate payo shock, a, over a T -period horizon, averaged across assets:
Ftimingjt =
1
TN j
NjX
i=1
T 1X
=0
(wjit+   wmit+ )(at++1); (10)
where N j is the number of individual assets held by fund j. The subscript t on the portfolio
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weights and the subscript t + 1 on the aggregate shock signify that the aggregate shock
is unknown at the time of portfolio formation. Relative to the market, a fund with a
high Ftiming overweights assets that have high (low) sensitivity to the aggregate shock
in anticipation of a positive (negative) aggregate shock realization and underweights assets
with a low (high) sensitivity.
When skilled investment managers allocate attention to stock-specic payo shocks, si,
information about si allows them to choose portfolios that covary with si. Fundamentals-
based stock picking ability, Fpicking, hich measures the covariance of a fund's portfolio
weights of each stock, relative to the market, with the stock-specic shock, si:
Fpickingjt =
1
N j
NjX
i=1
(wjit   wmit )(sit+1): (11)
How well the manager can choose portfolio weights in anticipation of future asset-specic
payo shocks is closely linked to her stock-picking ability.
Ftiming and Fpicking are closely related to commonly-used measures of market-timing
and stock-picking ability. Typical measures of market-timing ability estimate how a fund's
holdings of each asset, relative to the market, covary with the systematic component of
the stock return, over the next T periods. Before the market return rises, market timers
overweight assets that have high betas. Likewise, they underweight assets with high betas
in anticipation of a market decline. Similarly, stock picking typically measures how a fund's
holdings of each stock, relative to the market, covary with the idiosyncratic component of the
stock return. A fund that successfully picks stocks overweights assets that have subsequently
high idiosyncratic returns and underweights assets with low subsequent idiosyncratic returns.
The key dierence between our measures and the conventional ones is that picking and
timing measure how a portfolio covaries with returns, while Fpicking and Ftiming mea-
sure how a portfolio covaries with aggregate and rm-specic fundamentals. KVV examine
the cyclical behavior of funds' picking and timing ability, as measured in this more conven-
tional way and show that picking also rises in recessions and timing also rises in expansions,
just as Fpicking and Ftiming do. To test our theory as directly as possible, we use the
fundamentals-based measures because they correspond more closely to the idea in the model
that funds are learning about fundamentals and using signals about those fundamentals to
time the market and pick stocks.
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1.5 Prediction 2: Dispersion
Since many studies detect no skill, perhaps the most controversial implication of the previous
nding is that investment managers are processing information at all. Our second and third
predictions speak directly to that implication.
In recessions, as aggregate shocks become more volatile, the rm-specic shocks to assets'
payos account for less of the variation, and the comovement in stock payos rises. Since
asset payos comove more, the payos to all investment strategies that put xed weights on
assets should also comove more. But when investment managers are processing information,
this prediction is reversed. To see why, consider the Bayesian updating formula for the
posterior mean of asset payos. It is a weighted average of the prior mean  and the fund
j's signal jjf  N(f;), where each is weighted by their relative precision:
E[f jj] =
 
 1 +  1
 1  
 1+  1 j

(12)
In recessions, when the variance of the aggregate shock, a, rises, the prior beliefs about asset
payos become more uncertain:  rises and  1 falls. This makes the weight on prior beliefs
 decrease and the weight on the signal j increase. The prior  is common across agents,
while the signal j is heterogeneous. When informed managers weigh their heterogeneous
signals more, their resulting posterior beliefs become more dierent from each other and
more dierent from the beliefs of uninformed managers or investors. More disagreement
about asset payos results in more heterogeneous portfolios and portfolio returns.
Thus, the model's second prediction is that in recessions, the cross-sectional dispersion in
funds' investment strategies and returns should rise. The following Proposition shows that
funds' portfolio holdings and returns, q0j(f   pr), display higher cross-sectional dispersion
when aggregate risk is higher, in recessions.
Proposition 3. If condition (42) holds, K <  1a , then for given Kaj and Kij, an increase
in aggregate risk, a, increases the dispersion of funds' portfolios E[
P
if1;2;cg(qij   qi)2], and
their portfolio returns E[((qj   q)0(f   pr))2], where q 
R
qjdj.
As before, the parameter restriction is sucient, but not necessary, and is not very tight
when calibrated to the data.
Next, we consider the eect of an increase in the price of risk. The following result shows
that an increase in the price of risk increases the dispersion of portfolio returns.
15
Proposition 4. If the variance of asset supply shocks (x) is suciently high (conditions
(56) and (57) hold), then for given Kaj; Kij 8j , an increase in risk aversion  increases the
dispersion of funds' portfolio returns E[((qj   q)0(f   pr))2].
The primary reason return dispersion increases is that a higher  increases the price of risk
and thus the average level of returns. Since the dispersion in returns is increasing in the level
of returns, return dispersion increases as well. But this eect has to oset a counter-acting
force. Recall that the optimal portfolio for investor j takes the form q = (1=^j)(^j pr). If
 increases, the scale of q falls. The increase in returns needs to increase dispersion enough
to oset the decrease in dispersion coming from the eect of 1= reducing q.
To connect this Proposition to the data, we measure portfolio dispersion as the sum of
squared deviations of fund j's portfolio weight in asset i at time t, wjit, from the average
fund's portfolio weight in asset i at time t, wmit , summed over all assets held by fund j, N
j:
Portfolio Dispersionjt =
NjX
i=1
 
wjit   wmit
2
(13)
This measure is similar to the portfolio concentration measure in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and
Zheng (2005) and the active share measure in Cremers and Petajisto (2009). It is the same
quantity as in Proposition 3, except that the number of shares q is replaced with portfolio
weights w. Our numerical example shows that the model's fund Portfolio Dispersion,
dened over portfolio weights w, is higher in recessions as well. In recessions, the portfolios
of the informed managers dier more from each other and more from those of the uninformed
investors. Part of this dierence comes from a change in the composition of the risky asset
portfolio and part comes from dierences in the fraction of assets held in riskless securities.
Fund j's portfolio weight wjit is a fraction of the fund's assets, including both risky and
riskless, held in asset i. Thus, when one informed fund gets a bearish signal about the market,
its wjit for all risky assets i falls. Dispersion can rise when funds take dierent positions in
the risk-free asset, even if the fractional allocation among the risky assets remains identical.
The higher dispersion across funds' portfolio strategies translates into a higher cross-
sectional dispersion in fund abnormal returns (Rj   Rm). To facilitate comparison with
the data, we dene the dispersion of variable X as jXj   Xj. The notation X denotes the
equally weighted cross-sectional average across all investment managers (excluding non-fund
investors).
When funds get signals about the aggregate state a that are heterogenous, they take
dierent directional bets on the market. Some funds tilt their portfolios to high-beta assets
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and other funds to low-beta assets, thus creating dispersion in fund betas. To look for
evidence of this mechanism, we form a CAPM regression for fund j
Rjt = 
j + jRmt + 
j
""
j
t (14)
and test for an increase in the beta dispersion in recessions as well.
1.6 Prediction 3: Performance
The third prediction of the model is that the average performance of investment managers is
higher in recessions than it is in expansions. To measure performance, we want to measure
the portfolio return, adjusted for risk. One risk adjustment that is both analytically tractable
in our model and often used in empirical work is the certainty equivalent return, which is
also an investor's objective (5). The following Proposition shows that the average certainty
equivalent of skilled funds' returns exceeds that of unskilled funds or investors by more when
aggregate risk is higher, that is, in recessions.
Proposition 5. If (42) holds, then an increase in aggregate shock variance increases the
dierence between an informed investor expected certainty equivalent return and the expected
certainty equivalent return of an uninformed investor: @(Uj   UU)=@a > 0.
Corollary 1 in Appendix A.9 shows that a similar result holds for (risk unadjusted)
abnormal portfolio returns, dened as the fund's portfolio return, q0j(f   pr), minus the
market return, q0(f   pr).
Because asset payos are more uncertain, recessions are times when information is more
valuable. Therefore, the advantage of the skilled over the unskilled increases in recessions.
This informational advantage generates higher returns for informed managers. In equilib-
rium, market clearing dictates that alphas average to zero across all investors. However,
because the data only include mutual funds, our model calculations must similarly exclude
non-fund investors. Since investment managers are skilled or unskilled, while other investors
are only unskilled, an increase in the skill premium implies that an average manager's risk-
adjusted return rises in recessions.
Next, we consider the eect of an increase in the price of risk on performance. The
following result shows that the average certainty equivalent of skilled funds' returns exceeds
that of unskilled funds by more when the price of risk is higher, that is, in recessions.
17
Proposition 6. For given Kaj; K1j; K2j strictly positive, an increase in risk aversion 
for all investors increases the dierence in expected certainty equivalent returns between an
informed and an uninformed investor: @(Uj   UU)=@ > 0.
The reason that a higher price of risk leads to higher performance is that information can
resolve risk. Therefore, informed managers are compensated for risk that they do not bear
because the information has resolved some of their uncertainty about that random outcome.
When the price of risk rises, the value of being able to resolve this risk rises as well. Put
dierently, informed funds take larger positions in risky assets because they are less uncertain
about their returns. These larger positions pay o more on average when the price of risk is
high.
We measure outperformance by looking at risk-adjusted returns. One way to do that risk
adjustment is to estimate (14) for each fund and look at the  of that equation. We also
compute s for similar models with multiple risk factors.
1.7 Do the Theoretical Measures and Empirical Measures Have
the Same Properties?
The theoretical propositions refer to payos and quantities that have analytical expressions
in a model with CARA preferences and normally distributed asset payos. But they do
not correspond neatly to the returns and portfolio weights that are commonly used in the
empirical literature. The commonly used empirical measures, however, are not tractable
analytically. This raises the concern that, if we constructed Ftiming and Fpicking measures
in the model, allocating attention to aggregate shocks might not manifest itself as high
Ftiming and allocating attention to stock-specic risks might not be captured by high
Fpicking. To allay this concern, we choose parameters and simulate our model in which
each fund manager allocates attention and chooses his portfolio optimally. Then, we compute
equilibrium prices and portfolio weights and estimate the same regressions on the model-
generated data as we do in the real data. This exercise veries that the empirical and
theoretical measures have the same comparative statics.
The supplementary appendix explains how parameters are chosen to match moments of
the aggregate and individual stock returns in expansions and recessions, and it documents
a complete set of results. For brevity, we only discuss the key comparative statics here.
For our benchmark parameter values, all skilled managers exclusively allocate attention
to stock-specic shocks in expansions. In contrast, the bulk of skilled managers learn about
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the aggregate shock in recessions (87%, with the remaining 13% equally split between shocks
1 and 2). Thus, managers reallocate their attention over the business cycle. Such large swings
in attention allocation occur for a wide range of parameters.
This shift in attention allocation is clearly reected in the uctuations in Ftiming and
Fpicking. The simulation results show that skilled investors' Ftiming in recessions is orders
of magnitude higher than in expansions. Similarly, we nd that skilled funds have positive
Fpicking ability in expansions, when they allocate their attention to stock-specic informa-
tion. Our numerical results also conrm that there is a higher dispersion in the funds' betas,
and in their abnormal returns, in recessions. Lastly, the simulations conrm that abnormal
returns and alphas, dened as in the empirical literature, and averaged over all funds, are
higher in recessions than in expansions. Skilled investment managers have positive excess
returns, while the uninformed ones have negative excess returns. Aggregating returns across
skilled and unskilled funds results in higher average alphas in recessions.
1.8 Who Underperforms?
The requirement that markets clear implies that not all investors can be successful stock-
pickers or market-timers. In each period, someone must make poor stock-picking or market-
timing decisions. We explain now why rational, unskilled investors underperform in equilib-
rium.
Unskilled, passive investors have negative timing ability in recessions. When the aggre-
gate state a is low, most skilled investors sell, pushing down asset prices, p, and making
prior expected returns, (  pr), high. Equation (8) shows that uninformed investors' asset
holdings increase in (  pr). Thus, their holdings covary negatively with aggregate payos,
making their Ftiming measure negative. Since no investors learn about the aggregate shock
in expansions, prices do not fall when unexpected aggregate shocks are negative. Since the
price mechanism is shut down, Ftiming is close to zero for both skilled and unskilled in
expansions. Taken together, the average fund exhibits some ability to time the market and
exploits that ability at the expense of the uninformed investors, in recessions.
Likewise, unskilled investors will show negative stock-picking ability in expansions. When
the stock-specic shock si is low, and some investors know that it will be low, they will sell
and depress the price of asset i. A low price raises the expected return on the asset (i pir)
for uninformed investors. The high expected return induces them to buy more of the asset.
Since they buy more of assets that subsequently have negative asset-specic payo shocks,
these uninformed investors display negative stock-picking ability.
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1.9 Endogenous Capacity Choice
So far, we have assumed that skilled investment managers choose how to allocate a xed
information-processing capacity, K. We now extend the model to allow for skilled managers
to add capacity at a cost C (K).11 We draw three main conclusions. First, the proofs of
Propositions 1 and 2 hold for any chosen level of capacity K, below an upper bound, no
matter the functional form of C. Endogenous capacity only has quantitative, not qualitative
implications. Second, because the marginal utility of learning about the aggregate shock is
increasing in its prior variance (Proposition 1), skilled managers choose to acquire higher ca-
pacity in recessions. This extensive-margin eect amplies our benchmark, intensive-margin
result. Third, the degree of amplication depends on the convexity of the cost function,
C (K). The convexity determines how elastic equilibrium capacity choice is to the cyclical
changes in the marginal benet of learning. The supplementary appendix discusses numer-
ical simulation results from the endogenous-K model; they are similar to our benchmark
results.
2 Evidence from Equity Mutual Funds
Our model studies attention allocation over the business cycle, and its consequences for
investors' strategies. We now turn to a specic set of investors, active U.S. mutual fund
managers, to test the predictions of the model. The richness of the data makes the mutual
fund industry a great laboratory for these tests. In principle, similar tests could be conducted
for hedge funds, other professional investment managers, or even individual investors.
2.1 Data
Our sample builds upon several data sets. We begin with the Center for Research on Security
Prices (CRSP) survivorship bias-free mutual fund database. The CRSP database provides
comprehensive information about fund returns and a host of other fund characteristics, such
as size (total net assets), age, expense ratio, turnover, and load. Given the nature of our tests
and data availability, we focus on actively managed open-end U.S. equity mutual funds. We
further merge the CRSP data with fund holdings data from Thomson Financial. The total
number of funds in our merged sample is 3,477. In addition, for some of our exercises, we map
11We model this cost as a utility penalty, akin to the disutility from labor in business cycle models. Since
there are no wealth eects in our setting, it would be equivalent to modeling a cost of capacity through the
budget constraint. For a richer treatment of information production modeling, see Veldkamp (2006).
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funds to the names of their managers using information from CRSP, Morningstar, Nelson's
Directory of Investment Managers, Zoominfo, and Zabasearch. This mapping results in
a sample with 4,267 managers. We also use the CRSP/Compustat stock-level database,
which is a source of information on individual stocks' returns, market capitalizations, book-
to-market ratios, momentum, liquidity, and standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). The
aggregate stock market return is the value-weighted average return of all stocks in the CRSP
universe.
Following KVV, we use changes in monthly industrial production, obtained from the
Federal Reserve Statistical Release, as a proxy for aggregate shocks. Industrial production
is seasonally adjusted. We measure recessions using the denition of the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) business cycle dating committee. The start of the recession
is the peak of economic activity and its end is the trough. Our aggregate sample spans
312 months of data from January 1980 until December 2005, among which 38 are NBER
recession months (12%). We consider several alternative recession indicators and nd our
results to be robust.12
2.2 Motivating Fact: Aggregate Risk and Prices of Risk Rise in
Recessions
At the outset, we present empirical evidence for the main assumption in our model: Reces-
sions are periods in which individual stocks contain more aggregate risk and when prices of
risk are higher.
Table 1 shows that an average stock's aggregate risk increases substantially in recessions
whereas the change in idiosyncratic risk is not statistically dierent from zero. The table
uses monthly returns for all stocks in the CRSP universe. For each stock and each month, we
estimate a CAPM equation based on a twelve-month rolling-window regression, delivering
the stock's beta, it , and its residual standard deviation, 
i
"t. We dene the aggregate risk of
stock i in month t as jitmt j and its idiosyncratic risk as i"t, where mt is formed monthly as
the realized volatility from daily return observations. Panel A reports the results from a time-
12We have conrmed our results using an indicator variable for negative real consumption growth, the
Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI), and an indicator variable for the 25% lowest stock market
returns as alternative recession indicators. While its salience makes the NBER indicator a natural benchmark,
the other measures may be available in a more timely manner. Also, the CFNAI has the advantage that
it is a continuous variable, measuring the strength of economic activity. The results on performance are, if
anything, stronger using the CFNAI measure than they are with the NBER indicator. Results are omitted
for brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
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series regression of the aggregate (Columns 1 and 2) and the idiosyncratic risk (Columns
3 and 4), both averaged across stocks, on the NBER recession indicator variable.13 The
aggregate risk is twenty percent higher in recessions than it is in expansions (6.69% versus
8.04% per month), an economically and statistically signicant dierence. In contrast, the
stock's idiosyncratic risk is essentially identical in expansions and in recessions. The results
are similar whether one controls for other aggregate risk factors (Columns 2 and 4) or not
(Columns 1 and 3). Panel B reports estimates from pooled (panel) regressions of a stock's
aggregate risk (Columns 1 and 2) or idiosyncratic risk (Columns 3 and 4) on the recession
indicator variable, Recession, and additional stock-specic control variables including size,
book-to-market ratio, and leverage. The panel results conrm the time-series ndings.
A large literature in economics and nance presents evidence supporting the results in
Table 1. First, Ang and Chen (2002), Ribeiro and Veronesi (2002), and Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) document that stocks exhibit more comovement in recessions, consistent with stocks
carrying higher systematic risk in recessions. Second, Schwert (1989, 2011), Hamilton and
Lin (1996), Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), and Engle and Rangel (2008) show
that aggregate stock market return volatility is much higher during periods of low economic
activity. Diebold and Yilmaz (2008) nd a robust cross-country link between volatile stock
markets and volatile fundamentals. Third, Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2009) nd that
the volatilities of GDP and industrial production growth, obtained from GARCH estimation,
and the volatility implied by stock options are much higher during recessions. The same result
holds for the uncertainty in several establishment-, rm- and industry-level payo measures
they consider.14
The idea that the price of risk rises in recessions is supported by an empirical literature
that documents the counter-cyclical nature of risk premia on equity, bonds, options, and
currencies.15 The counter-cyclicality of the variance risk premium suggests that agents are
willing to pay a higher price for assets whose payos are high when return volatility is high
(Drechsler and Yaron 2010). A large theoretical literature has developed that generates such
counter-cyclical risk premia, e.g., the external habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
13The reported results are for equally weighted averages. Unreported results conrm that value-weighted
averaging across stocks delivers the same conclusion.
14Several other pieces of evidence also corroborate the link between volatility and recessions. First, la-
bor earnings volatility is substantially counter-cyclical (Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004)). Second,
small rms face more risk in recessions (Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000)). Finally, the notion of
Shumpeterian creative destruction is also consistent with such link.
15Among many others, Cochrane (2006), Ludvigson and Ng (2009), Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan
(2010), and the references therein.
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or the variable rare disasters model of Gabaix (2009).
2.3 Testing Prediction 1: Time-Varying Skill
Turning to our main model predictions, we rst test whether skilled investment managers
reallocate their attention over the business cycle in a way that is consistent with measures
of time-varying skill. Learning about the aggregate payo shock in recessions makes man-
agers choose portfolio holdings that covary more with the aggregate shock. Conversely, in
expansions, their holdings covary more with stock-specic information. In a purely empirical
paper, KVV show that the extent of market-timing and stock-picking skill varies over the
business cycle. We add to their ndings, by disentangling the risk price and volatility com-
ponents of the eect, show that both are independently signicant, and that the direction
of both eects supports the model's predictions.
To estimate time-varying skill, we need measures of Ftiming and Fpicking for each
fund j in each month t. KVV proxy for the aggregate payo shock with the innovation
in log industrial production growth. A time series of Ftimingjt is obtained by computing
the covariance of the innovations and each fund j's portfolio weights (as in equation (10)),
using twelve-month rolling windows. Following equation (11), Fpicking is computed in each
month t as a cross-sectional covariance across the assets between the fund's portfolio weights
and rm-specic earnings shocks (SUE). KVV then estimate the following two equations
using pooled (panel) regression model and calculating standard errors by clustering at the
fund and time dimensions.
Pickingjt = a0 + a1Recessiont + a2X
j
t + 
j
t ; (15)
Timingjt = a3 + a4Recessiont + a5X
j
t + "
j
t ; (16)
Recessiont is an indicator variable equal to one if the economy in month t is in recession, as
dened by the NBER, and zero otherwise. X is a vector of fund-specic control variables,
including the fund age, the fund size, the average fund expense ratio, the turnover rate, the
percentage ow of new funds, the fund load, and the fund style characteristics along the size,
value, and momentum dimensions.
The KVV parameter estimates appear in columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 of Table 2. Column 1
shows the results for a univariate regression model. In expansions, Ftiming is not dierent
from zero, implying that funds' portfolios do not comove with future macroeconomic infor-
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mation in those periods. In recessions, Ftiming increases. The increase amounts to ten
percent of a standard deviation of Ftiming. It is measured precisely, with a t-statistic of
3. To remedy the possibility of a bias in the coecient due to omitted fund characteristics
correlated with recession times, we turn to a multivariate regression. Our ndings, in Col-
umn 2, remain largely unaected by the inclusion of the control variables. Columns 4 and
5 of Table 2 show that the average Fpicking across funds is positive in expansions and sub-
stantially lower in recessions. The eect is statistically signicant at the 1% level. It is also
economically signicant: Fpicking decreases by approximately ten percent of one standard
deviation. KVV show that these results are robust to alternative measures of picking and
timing and alternative recession indicator variables, and they investigate in more detail the
strategies funds use to time the market.
Our model predicts that Ftiming should be higher in recessions, which means that the
coecient on Recession, a4, should be positive. Conversely, the fund's portfolio holdings
and its returns covary more with subsequent rm-specic shocks in expansions. Therefore,
our hypothesis is that Fpicking should fall in recessions, or that a1 should be negative. The
data support both predictions. Portfolio holdings are more sensitive to aggregate shocks in
recessions and more sensitive to rm-specic shocks in expansions.
Testing for Separate Eects of Volatility and Recessions. To identify a more nu-
anced prediction of the model, we can split the recession eect into that which comes from
aggregate volatility and that which comes from an increased price of risk. Proposition 1
predicts that an increase in aggregate volatility alone should cause managers to reallocate
attention to aggregate shocks. Furthermore, there should be an additional eect of reces-
sions, after controlling for aggregate volatility, that comes from the increase in the price of
risk (Proposition 2).
To test for these two separate eects, we re-estimate the previous results with both
an indicator for recessions and an indicator for high aggregate payo volatility. The high-
volatility indicator variable equals one in months with the highest volatility of aggregate
earnings growth, where aggregate volatility is estimated from Shiller's S&P 500 earnings
growth data.16 We include both NBER recession and high aggregate payo volatility indi-
cators as explanatory variables in an empirical horse race.
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2 show that both recession and volatility contribute to a lower
16We calculate the twelve-month rolling-window standard deviation of aggregate earnings growth. We
choose the volatility cuto such that 12% of months are selected, the same fraction as NBER recession
months.
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Fpicking in expansions and a higher Ftiming in recessions. For some of the results the
recession eect is slightly stronger, while for others the volatility eect is slightly stronger.
Clearly, there is an eect of recessions beyond the one coming through volatility. This is
consistent with the predictions of our model, where recessions are characterized both by an
increase in aggregate payo volatility and an increase in the price of risk.
2.4 Testing Prediction 2: Dispersion
The second main prediction of the model states that heterogeneity in fund investment strate-
gies and portfolio returns rises in recessions. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the fol-
lowing regression specication, using various return and investment heterogeneity measures,
generically denoted as Dispersionjt , the dispersion of fund j at month t.
Dispersionjt = b0 + b1Recessiont + b2X
j
t + 
j
t ; (17)
The denitions of Recession and other controls mirror those in regression (15). Our coe-
cient of interest is b1.
The rst dispersion measure we examine is Portfolio Dispersion, dened in equation
(13). It measures a deviation of a fund's investment strategy from a passive market strategy,
and hence, in equilibrium, from the strategies of other investors. The results in Columns
1 and 2 of Table 3 indicate an increase in average Portfolio Dispersion across funds in
recessions. The increase is statistically signicant at the 1% level. It is also economically
signicant: The value of portfolio dispersion in recessions goes up by about 15% of a standard
deviation.
Since dispersion in fund strategies should generate dispersion in fund returns, we next
look for evidence of higher return dispersion in recessions. To measure dispersion, we use the
absolute deviation between fund j's return and the equally weighted cross-sectional average,
jreturnjt returntj, as the dependent variable in (17). Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 show that
return dispersion increases by 80% in recessions. Finally, portfolio and return dispersion in
recessions should come from dierent directional bets on the market. This should show up as
an increase in the dispersion of portfolio betas. Columns 3 and 4 show that the CAPM-beta
dispersion also increases by about 30% in recessions, all consistent with the predictions of
our model.
These ndings are robust. Counter-cyclical dispersion in funds' portfolio strategies is
also found in measures of fund style shifting and sectoral asset allocation. The dispersion in
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returns is also found for abnormal returns and fund alphas. Results available on request.
Testing for Separate Eects of Volatility and Recessions. Propositions 3 and 4 tell
us that return dispersion increases in recessions for two reasons. One is that the volatility
of aggregate shocks increases and the other reason is that the price of risk increases. We
can disentangle these two eects by regressing return dispersion on volatility and recession
simultaneously. The model would predict that volatility should be a signicant determi-
nant of dispersion and that after controlling for volatility, there should be some additional
explanatory power of recessions that comes from the price of risk eect.
Column 7 of Table 3 shows that both the return and the volatility eects are present
in the data. Both are associated with a signicant increase in the dispersion of returns.
After including the volatility variable, the magnitude of the coecient on recessions falls by
47%, suggesting that volatility and price of risk uctuations have roughly an equal eect on
portfolio dispersion.
2.5 Testing Prediction 3: Performance
The third prediction of our model is that recessions are times when information allows funds
to earn higher average risk-adjusted returns. We evaluate this hypothesis using the following
regression specication:
Performancejt = c0 + c1Recessiont + c2X
j
t + 
j
t (18)
where Performancejt denotes fund j's performance in month t, measured as fund abnormal
returns, or CAPM, three-factor, or four-factor alphas. All returns are net of management
fees. The coecient of interest is c1.
Column 1 of Table 4 shows that the average fund's net return is 3bp per month lower
than the market return in expansions, but it is 34bp per month higher in recessions. This
dierence is highly statistically signicant and becomes even larger (42bp), after we control
for fund characteristics (Column 2). Similar results (Columns 3 and 4) obtain when we use
the CAPM alpha as a measure of fund performance, except that the alpha in expansions
becomes negative. When we use alphas based on the three- and four-factor models, the
recession return premiums diminish (Columns 5-8). But in recessions, the four-factor alpha
still represents a non-trivial 1% per year risk-adjusted excess return, 1.6% higher than the
-0.6% recorded in expansions (signicant at the 1% level). The advantage of this cross-
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sectional regression model is that it allows us to include a host of fund-specic control
variables. The disadvantage is that performance is measured using past twelve-month rolling-
window regressions. Thus, a given observation can be classied as a recession when some or
even all of the remaining eleven months of the window are expansions.
To verify the robustness of our cross-sectional results, we also employ a time-series ap-
proach. In each month, we form the equally weighted portfolio of funds and calculate its
net return, in excess of the risk-free rate. We then regress this time series of fund portfolio
returns on Recession and common risk factors, adjusting standard errors for heteroscedas-
ticity and autocorrelation. We nd similar outperformance in recessions. Our results are
also robust to alternative performance measures, such as gross fund returns, gross alphas,
or the information ratio (the ratio of the CAPM alpha to the CAPM residual volatility).
All increase sharply in recessions. Finally, we nd similar results when we lead alpha on the
left-hand side by one month instead of using a contemporaneous alpha. All results point in
the same direction: Outperformance increases in recessions.
Testing for Separate Eects of Volatility and Recessions. As before, two forces
increase the performance of funds relative to non-funds in recessions: the increase in volatility
and the increase in the price of risk (propositions 5 and 6). Column 9 of Table 4 shows that
the data are consistent with each force having a distinct eect on fund outperformance. We
use the 4-factor alpha as the dependent variable for this exercise because we want to avoid
conating more risk taking in recessions with greater fund outperformance in recessions.
When we regress each fund's 4-factor alpha on a recession indicator and a volatility measure,
both have positive, signicant coecients. Adding the volatility variable reduces the size
of the recession eect by 28%. This suggests that fund outperformance in recessions is due
mostly to the increased price of risk and is due to a lesser extent to the higher volatility of
aggregate shocks. But the fact that both variables have a signicant relationship with fund
outperformance, dispersion, and attention, in the direction predicted by the theory oers
solid support for the model.
3 Alternative Explanations
The existing literature has not yet advanced any alternative explanations for time-varying
skill, as far as we know. We briey review categories of mutual fund theories and detail the
facts with which they are compatible and incompatible. Ultimately, we conclude that while
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various explanations can account for some of the facts, they are unlikely to account for all
facts jointly.
Fund skill changes because fund managers change. While our model is silent about
the distinction between funds and fund managers, in practice, skill could be embodied in the
manager or be produced by the organizational setup of the fund. Table 5 re-estimates our
main results using the cross section of data at the manager level. The eects of recession on
Ftiming/Fpicking, dispersion, and performance are essentially unchanged, suggesting that
the distinction is not important for our results.
Sample selection Suppose that managers have heterogeneous skill, but they do not dis-
play the cyclical variation in attention allocation we envision. Furthermore, suppose that
the best managers leave the sample in good times, maybe because they go to a hedge fund.
Then the composition eect would deliver lower alphas and less dispersion in expansions. If
for some reason skill is associated with high Ftiming and low Fpicking, it could also explain
the attention allocation results.
This story is incompatible with at least four facts. First, Table 5 shows that the results
all survive when managers are the unit of observation and when we include manager xed
eects. Including xed eects in a regression model is a standard response to sample selection
concerns. We also add fund xed eects to our original specication. The results do not
change in either case. Second, KVV show that the same managers who have high Fpicking
in expansions also have high Ftiming in recessions. This is inconsistent with a composition
eect. Third, even though there is a higher chance of being promoted or picked o by a hedge
fund in expansions, there is also a higher likelihood of being red or demoted in recessions.
The former eect could explain low return dispersion in expansions, but the latter eect
would also depress dispersion in recessions, leaving little or no cyclical uctuation. Fourth,
KVV nd no systematic dierences in age, educational background, or experience of fund
managers in recessions versus expansions.
Convex ow-performance relationship Kaniel and Kondor (2010) show that the con-
vex relationship between mutual fund performance and fund inows { typically a determinant
of the manager's compensation { can explain outperformance and higher portfolio dispersion
in recessions. Section 1 already explained that any theories where managers learn, even if
they do not actively reallocate their attention, can also explain these facts. While Kaniel
and Kondor explain counter-cyclical dispersion and other salient long-run features of asset
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markets that our theory does not address, they do not oer a competing answer to our main
question, which is why skill measures are cyclical. Similarly, existing theories do not explain
why dispersion and performance have a component that is correlated with macroeconomic
volatility, even after controlling for recessions. These are the facts most specic to our theory.
Career concerns Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show that young managers with career
concerns may have an incentive to herd. It would seem logical that the concern for being
red would be greatest in recessions. But if that were the case, herding should be most
prevalent in recessions and it should make the dispersion in portfolios decline. Instead, the
results in Table 3 show that portfolio dispersion rises in recessions.
Since portfolio dispersion rises in recessions, one might be tempted to instead construct
a story whereby career concerns are actually stronger in expansions. But if that is true, then
there should be an interaction eect: Younger managers should be more likely to hold port-
folios with low dispersion in expansions, meaning that in recessions, their portfolio dispersion
should increase by more. Conversely, older managers' portfolio dispersion should change less
over the cycle. This suggests that when we regress portfolio dispersion on recession, age and
the interaction of recession and age, the interaction term should have a negative sign (disper-
sion for older managers decreases less in recessions). Instead, we nd a signicantly positive
interaction eect. While labor market considerations may be important for understanding
many aspects of the behavior of mutual fund managers, the above argument suggests that
they cannot account for the empirical patterns we document.
Time-varying marginal utility Glode (2011) argues that funds outperform in recessions
because their investors' marginal utility is highest in such periods. While complementary to
our explanation, his work remains silent on what strategies investment managers pursue to
achieve this dierential performance. Therefore, it does not explain why the nature of skill
changes over time.
Mechanical eects The nal alternative explanation we consider is that our eects arise
mechanically from the properties of asset returns. To rule this out, KVV verify that several
mechanical mutual fund strategies cannot reproduce the observed features of fund returns.
The mechanical strategies include 1) an equally-weighted portfolio of 75 (or 50 or 100)
randomly chosen stocks by all funds; 2) half the funds choose 75 random stocks from the top
half of the alpha distribution and the other half choose 75 stocks from the bottom half of
the alpha distribution; and 3) half the funds pick from the top half of the beta distribution
29
with the other half of funds choosing from the bottom half. None of the strategies explored
generate anything that resembles time-varying skill, counter-cyclical dispersion, or counter-
cyclical performance.
4 Conclusion
Do investment managers add value for their clients? The answer to this question matters for
problems ranging from the discussion of market eciency to a practical portfolio advice for
households. The large amount of randomness in nancial asset returns makes it a dicult
question to answer. The multi-billion investment management business is rst and foremost
an information-processing business. We model investment managers not only as agents
making optimal portfolio decisions, but also as human beings with nite mental capacity,
who optimally allocate that capacity to process information (their attention) at each point
in time. Since the optimal attention allocation varies with the state of the economy, so do
investment strategies and fund returns. As long as a subset of skilled investment managers
can process information about future asset payos, the model predicts a higher covariance
of portfolio holdings with aggregate asset payo shocks, more cross-sectional dispersion in
portfolio investment strategies and returns across funds, and a higher average outperformance
in recessions. We observe these patterns in investments and returns of actively managed
U.S. mutual funds. Hence, the data are consistent with a world in which some investment
managers have skill.
Beyond the mutual fund industry, a sizeable fraction of GDP currently comes from in-
dustries that produce and process information (consulting, business management, product
design, marketing analysis, accounting, rating agencies, equity analysts, etc.). Ever increas-
ing access to information has made the problem of how to best allocate a limited amount
of information-processing capacity even more relevant. While information choices have con-
sequences for real outcomes, they are often poorly understood because they are dicult to
measure. By predicting how information choices are linked to observable variables (such as
the state of the economy) and by tying information choices to real outcomes (such as portfo-
lio investment), we show how models of information choices can be brought to the data. This
information-choice-based approach could be useful in examining other information-processing
sectors of the economy.
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Table 1: Individual Stocks Have More Aggregate Risk in Recessions
For each stock i and month t, we estimate a CAPM equation based on twelve months of data (a twelve-month
rolling-window regression). This estimation delivers the stock's beta, it, and its residual standard deviation,
i"t. We dene stock i's aggregate risk in month t as
itmt  and its idiosyncratic risk as i"t, where mt
is the realized volatility from daily market return observations. Panel A reports results from a time-series
regression of the average stock's aggregate risk, 1N
PN
i=1
itmt , in Columns 1 and 2, and of the average
idiosyncratic risk, 1N
PN
i=1 
i
"t, in Columns 3 and 4 on Recession. Recession is an indicator variable equal to
one for every month the economy is in a recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. In Columns
2 and 4 we include several aggregate control variables: the market excess return (MKTPREM), the return
on the small-minus-big portfolio (SMB), the return on the high-minus-low book-to-market portfolio (HML),
the return on the up-minus-down momentum portfolio (UMD). The data are monthly from 1980-2005 (309
months). Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Panel
B reports results of panel regressions of each stock's aggregate risk,
itmt , in Columns 1 and 2 and of its
idiosyncratic risk, i"t, in Columns 3 and 4 on Recession. In Columns 2 and 4 we include several rm-specic
control variables: the log market capitalization of the stock, log(Size), the ratio of book equity to market
equity, B  M , the average return over the past year, Momentum, the stock's ratio of book debt to book
debt plus book equity, Leverage, and an indicator variable, NASDAQ, equal to one if the stock is traded
on NASDAQ. All control variables are lagged one month. The data are monthly and cover all stocks in
the CRSP universe for 1980-2005. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the stock and time
dimensions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggregate Risk Idiosyncratic Risk
Panel A: Time-Series Regression
Recession 1.348 1.308 0.058 0.016
(0.693) (0.678) (1.018) (1.016)
MKTPREM -4.034 -1.865
(3.055) (3.043)
SMB 8.110 12.045
(3.780) (4.293)
HML 0.292 9.664
(5.458) (8.150)
UMD -4.279 -1.112
(2.349) (3.888)
Constant 6.694 6.748 13.229 13.196
(0.204) (0.212) (0.286) (0.276)
Observations 309 309 309 309
Panel B: Pooled Regression
Recession 1.203 1.419 0.064 0.510
(0.242) (0.238) (0.493) (0.580)
Log(Size) -0.145 -1.544
(0.021) (0.037)
B-M Ratio -0.934 -2.691
(0.056) (0.086)
Momentum 0.097 2.059
(0.101) (0.177)
Leverage -0.600 -1.006
(0.074) (0.119)
NASDAQ 0.600 1.937
(0.075) (0.105)
Constant 4.924 4.902 12.641 12.592
(0.092) (0.095) (0.122) (0.144)
Observations 1,312,216 1,312,216 1,312,216 1,312,216
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Table 2: Attention Allocation is Cyclical
Dependent variables: Fund j's Ftimingjt is dened in equation (10), where the rolling window T is 12 months
and the aggregate shock at+1 is the change in industrial production growth between t and t+ 1. A fund j's
Fpickingjt is dened as in equation (11), where sit+1 is the change in asset i's earnings growth between t
and t+ 1. All are multiplied by 10,000 for readability.
Independent variables: Recession is an indicator variable equal to one for every month the economy is in
a recession according to the NBER, and zero otherwise. Log(Age) is the natural logarithm of fund age in
years. Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of a fund total net assets. Expenses is the fund expense ratio.
Turnover is the fund turnover ratio. Flow is the percentage growth in a fund's new money. Load is the total
fund load. The last three control variables measure the style of a fund along the size, value, and momentum
dimensions, calculated from the scores of the stocks in their portfolio in that month. They are omitted for
brevity. All control variables are demeaned. Flow and Turnover are winsorized at the 1% level. V olatility is
an indicator variable for periods of volatile earnings. We calculate the twelve-month rolling-window standard
deviation of the year-to-year log change in the earnings of S&P 500 index constituents; the earnings data
are from Robert Shiller for 1926-2008. Volatility equals one if this standard deviation is in the highest 10%
of months in the 1926-2008 sample. During 1985-2005, 12% of months are such high volatility months. The
data are monthly and cover the period 1980 to 2005. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by fund
and time.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ftiming Fpicking
Recession 0.011 0.011 0.011 -0.682 -0.696 -0.503
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.159) (0.150) (0.166)
Volatility 0.000 -0.477
(0.003) (0.106)
Log(Age) -0.002 -0.002 0.423 0.416
(0.001) (0.001) (0.060) (0.060)
Log(TNA) -0.001 -0.001 -0.173 -0.167
(0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.029)
Expenses -0.330 -0.331 88.756 90.911
(0.244) (0.247) (11.459) (11.599)
Turnover -0.004 -0.004 -0.204 -0.199
(0.001) (0.001) (0.053) (0.063)
Flow -0.008 -0.008 1.692 1.668
(0.010) (0.010) (0.639) (0.632)
Load 0.017 0.017 -9.644 -10.009
(0.023) (0.023) (1.972) (1.984)
Constant -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 3.084 3.086 3.124
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.069) (0.070) (0.074)
Observations 224,257 224,257 224,257 166,328 166,328 166,328
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Table 3: Portfolio and Return Dispersion Rises in Recessions
Dependent variables: Portfolio dispersion is the Herndahl index of portfolio weights in stocks i 2 f1;    ; Ng
in deviation from the market portfolio weights
PN
i=1(w
j
it   wmit )2  100. Return dispersion is jreturnjt  
returntj, where return denotes the (equally weighted) cross-sectional average. The CAPM beta comes from
twelve-month rolling-window regressions of fund-level excess returns on excess market returns (and returns
on SMB, HML, and MOM). Beta dispersion is constructed analogously to return dispersion. The right-hand
side variables, the sample period, and the standard error calculation are the same as in Table 2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Portfolio Dispersion Beta Dispersion Return Dispersion
Recession 0.205 0.147 0.082 0.083 0.530 0.561 0.298
(0.027) (0.026) (0.015) (0.014) (0.108) (0.101) (0.148)
Volatility 0.581
(0.223)
Log(Age) 0.203 -0.009 -0.064 -0.118
(0.028) (0.002) (0.007) (0.018)
Log(TNA) -0.179 0.003 0.029 0.025
(0.014) (0.001) (0.004) (0.011)
Expenses 28.835 5.460 13.816 23.264
(4.860) (0.235) (1.152) (2.655)
Turnover -0.092 0.020 0.074 0.092
(0.025) (0.001) (0.006) (0.014)
Flow 0.122 0.022 0.479 0.017
(0.104) (0.017) (0.088) (0.221)
Load -1.631 -0.444 -1.738 -3.501
(0.907) (0.042) (0.182) (0.532)
Constant 1.525 1.524 0.229 0.229 0.586 0.659 1.845
(0.024) (0.022) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.027) (0.079)
Observations 230,185 230,185 227,159 227,159 226,745 226,745 226,745
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Table 4: Fund Performance Improves in Recessions
Dependent variables: Abnormal Return is the fund return minus the market return. The alphas come from
twelve-month rolling-window regressions of fund-level excess returns on excess market returns for the CAPM
alpha, additionally on the SMB and the HML factors for the three-factor alpha, and additionally on the
UMD factor for the four-factor alpha. The independent variables, the sample period, and the standard error
calculations are the same as in Table 2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Abnormal Return CAPM Alpha 3-Factor Alpha 4-Factor Alpha
Recession 0.342 0.425 0.337 0.404 0.043 0.073 0.107 0.139 0.100
(0.056) (0.058) (0.048) (0.047) (0.034) (0.028) (0.041) (0.032) (0.035)
Volatility 0.125
(0.064)
Log(Age) -0.031 -0.036 -0.028 -0.039 -0.036
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(TNA) 0.046 0.033 0.009 0.012 0.010
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Expenses -1.811 -2.372 -7.729 -7.547 -8.187
(1.046) (0.945) (0.782) (0.745) (0.787)
Turnover -0.023 -0.044 -0.074 -0.065 -0.067
(0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Flow 2.978 2.429 1.691 1.536 1.536
(0.244) (0.172) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096)
Load -0.809 -0.757 -0.099 -0.335 -0.223
(0.226) (0.178) (0.131) (0.141) (0.141)
Constant -0.027 -0.033 -0.059 -0.063 -0.059 -0.060 -0.050 -0.052 -0.065
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 226,745 226,745 226,745 226,745 226,745 226,745 226,745 226,745 226,745
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Table 5: Robustness: Managers as the Unit of Observation
The dependent variables are fundamentals-based market-timing ability (Ftiming), fundamentals-based stock-
picking ability (Fpicking), portfolio dispersion (Dispersion), and the four-factor alpha (4-Factor Alpha), all
of which are tracked at the manager level. Columns with a `Y' include manager xed eects. The independent
variables, the sample period, and the standard error calculations are the same as in Table 2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ftiming Fpicking Dispersion 4-Factor Alpha
Recession 0.008 0.007 -0.701 -0.824 0.105 0.142 0.167 0.141
(0.003) (0.002) (0.130) (0.132) (0.031) (0.024) (0.035) (0.035)
Log(Age) -0.002 -0.004 0.460 0.268 0.154 0.017 -0.032 -0.069
(0.001) (0.001) (0.066) (0.065) (0.032) (0.021) (0.006) (0.008)
Log(TNA) -0.000 -0.000 -0.126 -0.139 -0.131 -0.093 0.007 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.033) (0.018) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005)
Expenses 0.130 0.060 127.222 45.894 43.920 13.241 -8.225 -10.590
(0.105) (0.146) (13.972) (13.867) (6.012) (4.504) (0.794) (1.138)
Turnover -0.005 -0.004 -0.287 0.210 -0.127 -0.014 -0.081 -0.035
(0.002) (0.002) (0.077) (0.090) (0.030) (0.020) (0.010) (0.009)
Flow -0.009 -0.016 1.037 1.186 0.154 -0.374 1.832 1.483
(0.009) (0.009) (0.613) (0.554) (0.121) (0.101) (0.097) (0.089)
Load -0.009 -0.069 -16.064 -5.832 -4.674 -0.231 -0.426 0.097
(0.017) (0.023) (2.393) (2.307) (1.284) (0.809) (0.151) (0.172)
Fixed Eect N Y N Y N Y N Y
Constant -0.002 -0.002 2.966 2.977 1.438 1.447 -0.045 -0.043
(0.001) (0.001) (0.072) (0.068) (0.026) (0.008) (0.024) (0.021)
Observations 332,676 332,676 249,942 249,942 332,776 332,776 332,776 332,776
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A Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Following Admati (1985), we conjecture that the price vector p is linear in the payo vector f and
the supply vector x: pr = A+Bf + Cx. We now verify that conjecture by imposing market clearingZ
qjdj = x+ x (19)
Using (35) to substitute out the left hand side, and rearranging,
pr =  (x+ x) + f +  1(  f)
Thus, the coecients A, B, and C are given by
A =  x+  1 (20)
B = I    1 (21)
C =   (22)
which veries our conjecture.
A.2 Mathematical Preliminaries
Matrices in terms of fundamental variances To determine the eect of changes in aggregate shock
variance on dispersion and prots, we need to express some of the matrices in terms of  1a . If we can
decompose the matrices into components that depend on a and those that do not, we can dierentiate the
expressions more easily.
First, we decompose the payo precision matrices. To do this decomposition, we need to invert . Doing
it by hand yields
 1 =
264 
 1
1 0  b1 11
0  12  b2 12
 b1 11  b2 12  1a + b21 11 + b22 12
375 (23)
Similarly, the posterior precision matrix for investor j is
^ 1j =
264 ^
 1
1 0  b1^ 11
0 ^ 12  b2^ 12
 b1^ 11  b2^ 12 ^a 1 + b21^ 11 + b22^ 12
375 (24)
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It is useful to separate out the terms that depend on a from those that do not. Dene
S 
264 
 1
1 0  b1 11
0  12  b2 12
 b1 11  b2 12 b21 11 + b22 12
375 (25)
and let S^j be the posterior S, meaning that each 1 is replaced with the posterior variance ^1j and each 2
is replaced with the posterior variance ^2j .
a 
264 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 1
375 and 1 
264 1 0  b10 0 0
 b1 0 b21
375 (26)
so that @^ 1j =@^a
 1 = a and @^ 1j =@^1
 1 = 1.
Then,
 1 = S +  1a a (27)
^ 1j = S^j + ^a
 1
j a (28)
Dene the average posterior precision matrix when a fraction  of investment managers have capacity to
be () 1  R
j
^ 1j dj. Similarly, let S
a  R
j
S^jdj and let Ka be the average amount of capacity that an
agent devotes to processing aggregate information. For example, if a fraction  of investors are skilled, and
all skilled investors devote all their capacity K to processing aggregate information, Ka = K. Recall that
^a
 1
j = 
 1
a +Kaj , then
() 1 = Sa + ( 1a + Ka)a (29)
Useful matrices and expressions We derive several matrices and expressions that recur frequently in
the proofs below.
1)   ^ 1j   () 1 =  1j   () 1: The dierence between the precision of an informed manager's
posterior beliefs and the precision of the average manager's posterior beliefs is computed as:
^ 1j   () 1 = S^j   Sa + (Kaj   Ka)a (30)
Now we show the equality. Bayes' rule for variances of normal variables is ^ 1j = 
 1 +  1j . Integrating
the left and right sides of this expression over managers j yields () 1 =  1 + () 1. Subtracting one
expression from the other yields ^ 1j  () 1 =  1j  () 1. Therefore,   ^ 1j  () 1 =  1j  () 1.
Observe that  is positive denite as long as the investor is more informed than the average: Kaj > Ka and
Kij > Ki for i 2 f1; 2g.
2) : To compute the average variance we need to invert () 1. Replacing a with ( 1a + Ka)
 1 and
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i with (
 1
i +
Ki)
 1; i 2 f1; 2g in Eq. (24), and following the same inversion steps backwards, we get
 = ( 1a + Ka)
 1bb0 +; (31)
where b is the 31 vector of loadings of each asset on aggregate risk, and if K1 and K2 represent the average
amount of capacity devoted to processing information about assets 1 and 2,
 
264 (
 1
1 +
K1)
 1 0 0
0 ( 12 + K2)
 1 0
0 0 0
375
3)  1: Let a  ( 1a + Ka) 1, 1  ( 11 + K1) 1 and 2  ( 12 + K2) 1. Then we have the
following results:
 1 = (abb0 +)(S +  1a a)
= abb
0S +  1a a + a
 1
a bb
0a +S
=
264 1
 1
1 0 b1(a
 1
a   1 11 )
0 2
 1
2 b2(a
 1
a   2 12 )
0 0 a
 1
a
375 (32)
where we have used that bb0S = 0, a = 0, bb0a is a matrix of zeros except for the last column which
is equal to b and S is equal to the rst rows of S multiplied by 1 and 2 respectively. We have that
trace( 1) = 1 11 + 2
 1
2 + a
 1
a .
4)  1 :
 1  = (a 1a bb
0a +S)(abb0 +)
= 2a
 1
a bb
0abb0 + a 1a bb
0a+ aSbb0 +S
= 2a
 1
a bb
0 + diag(~21
 1
1 ; ~
2
2
 1
2 ; 0)
=
264 
2
a
 1
a b
2
1 + ~
2
1
 1
1 
2
a
 1
a b1b2 
2
a
 1
a b1
2a
 1
a b1b2 
2
a
 1
a b
2
2 + ~
2
2
 1
2 
2
a
 1
a b2
2a
 1
a b1 
2
a
 1
a b2 
2
a
 1
a
375 (33)
where we have used that bb0S = 0, a = 0, bb0abb0 = bb0 and S is equal to the matrix described as a
diagonal above. We have that the trace( 1 ) = 2a
 1
a [1 + b
2
1 + b
2
2] + ~
2
1
 1
1 + ~
2
2
 1
2 .
Signal about asset payos f It is convenient for the proofs below to express the signal as the true
asset payo plus noise as follows: j = f + j , where j  N (0; GejG0), ej = diagfK 1a ;K 11 ;K 12 g, and
G =
264 b1 1 0b2 0 1
1 0 0
375. Then the posterior precision is given by ^ 1j =  1+ 1j , where  1j =  1j = GejG0.
Note that  1j and its inverse are positive denite as long as Ka;K1;K2 are strictly positive. We will assume
this throughout the proofs.
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Average portfolio holdings The optimal portfolio for investor j is
qj =
1

^ 1j (^j   pr) (34)
This comes from the rst order condition and is a standard expression in any portfolio problem with CARA
or mean-variance utility. Next, compute the portfolio of the average investor. Let the average of all investors'
posterior precision be () 1  R ^ 1j dj. Use the fact that ^j = ^j 1+ (I   ^j 1)~j and the fact that
the signal noise is mean-zero to get that
R
^ 1j ^jdj = 
 1 + (() 1    1)f . This is true because the
mean of all investors' signals are the true payos f and because the signal errors are uncorrelated with (but
of course, not independent of) signal precision.
q 
Z
qjdj =
1

 
 1+ (() 1    1)f   () 1pr (35)
Using Bayes' rule for the posterior variance of normal variables, we can rewrite this as
q 
Z
qjdj =
1


 1+  1~ f   () 1pr

(36)
where  1~   1    1 is the average investor's signal precision.
Mean and variance of asset returns The vector of asset returns is (f   pr). Now replace pr with
A+Bf + Cx, where A, B, and C are given by Appendix A.1,
f   pr = (I  B)f  A  Cx (37)
Substituting in the coecients in the pricing equation reveals that (I   B)   A = x, that I   B =
 1, and that C =  , and therefore f   pr = ( 1(f   ) + x+ x). Since a linear combination of
two normal variables is also a normal variable, we can write
f   pr = w + V 1=2z where z  N(0; I); (38)
V  V ar[f   pr] = ( 1 + 2xI) (39)
w  E[f   pr] = x: (40)
A key partial derivative for evaluating comparative statics will be @V@a . So, it is useful to evaluate that
here. Use (31) and (33) to write V as
V = 2a
 1
a bb
0 + diag(~21
 1
1 ; ~
2
2
 1
2 ; 0) + 
2x[abb
0 +]2
When taking the partial derivative with respect to a, we hold Ka xed. Note that 
 1
a    1a +Ka. Thus,
@V=@a = 
2
a
 2
a [2a
 1
a   1]bb0 + 22x2a 2a bb0 (41)
Note that this is multiplied by 2a
 2
a > 0 throughout and post-multiplied by bb
0, which is positive denite.
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Since a product of positive denite matrices is positive denite, a sucient condition for @V=@a positive
denite is
[2a
 1
a   1]I + 22x  is positive denite: (42)
This is the condition under which the variance of expected returns increases when aggregate shock
variance increases. If 2a
 1
a > 1, which implies that Ka < 
 1
a , this derivative will be positive. Since
the maximum possible average capacity devoted to the aggregate shock is the total capacity of informed
investors K times the fraction of informed investors, a sucient condition for @V=@a to be positive denite
is that K <  1a . Note also that the second term is a positive denite matrix. Suppose we do an
eigen-decomposition: Let  =    0. Note that I =  I  0. Thus, the eigenvalue matrix of the sum in (42) is
[2a
 1
a  1]I+22x. Since  is positive denite, all the entries of  are positive. Thus, if x is suciently
large, the whole eigenvalue matrix will be positive and therefore, @V=@a will be positive denite. Thus a
second sucient condition for (42) to hold is x suciently large.
Portfolio dispersion Using the optimal portfolio expressions, (34) and (36), and Bayes' rule (^j =
^j(
 1+ 1j j)), the dierence in portfolios (qj   q) is
(qj   q) = 1

h
 1j j   () 1f + (() 1   ^ 1j )pr
i
where ()
 1  R  1j dj is the average manager's signal precision.
Next, we need to take into account that signals and payos are correlated. To do this, replace the signal
j with the true payo, plus signal noise: j = f + j ,
(qj   q) = 1

h
 1j j + (
 1
j   () 1)f   (^ 1j   () 1)pr
i
Recall that   ^ 1j   () 1 =  1j   () 1. Substituting this in and combining terms yields
(qj   q) = 1


 1j ej +(f   pr)

Substituting (38) yields
(qj   q) = 1

h
 1 j +(V
1=2z + w)
i
(43)
To work out the expectation of this quantity squared, recognize that this is the square of a sum of one
constant and two, independent, mean-zero, normal variables. Since j and x are independent, all the cross
terms drop out, leaving
E[(qj   q)0(qj   q)] = 1
2
[Tr( 1j ) + Tr(V) + w
0w] (44)
Expected portfolio return Let z  N(0; I) and V  ( 1 + 2xI) as in the previous section, then
f   pr can be expressed as:
f   pr = ((I  B)f  A  Cx) = (x+ 1(f   ) + x) = w + V 1=2z
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Recalling (43), the expected prots are given by:
E[(qj   q)0(f   pr)] = 1

E
h
[ 1j j +(V
1=2z + w)]0(V 1=2z + w)
i
=
1

E
h
0j
 1
j w + 
0
j
 1
j V
1=2z + (w0 + z0V 1=2)(V 1=2z + w)
i
=
1

E
h
0j
 1
j w + 
0
j
 1
j V
1=2z + 2w0V 1=2z + w0w + z0V 1=2V 1=2z
i
=
1

E
h
w0w + z0V 1=2V 1=2z
i
=
1

h
2x0 x+ Tr

V 1=2V 1=2E(zz0)
i
=
1

h
2x0 x+ Tr(V )
i
= Tr(x0 x) +
1

Tr(V ) (45)
where the fourth equality comes from the fact that j and z are mean zero and uncorrelated.
Dispersion of portfolio returns Using results from the previous part, the dispersion in fund prots is
given by:
E[((qj   q)0(f   pr))2] = E
"
1

[ 1 ej +V
1=2z +w]0(w + V 1=2z)
2#
Using the fact that for any random variable x we have that V (x) = E(x2) E2(x), the dispersion of funds'
portfolio returns is equal to:
E[((qj   q)0(f   pr))2] = 1
2
E
h
[ 1j ej +V
1=2z +w]0(V 1=2z + w)
2i
=
1
2
V ar

[ 1j ej +V
1=2z +w]0(V 1=2z + w)

+
1
2

E[ 1j ej +V
1=2z +w]0(V 1=2z + w)
2
We compute each term separately.
V ar() = V ar
h
e0j
 1
j w + e
0
j
 1
j V
1=2z + 2w0V 1=2z + w0w + z0V 1=2V 1=2z
i
= V ar
h
e0j
 1
j w + e
0
j
 1
j V
1=2z + 2w0V 1=2z + w0w + z0V 1=2V 1=2z
i
= w0 1j w + 0 + 4w
0Vw + 0 + 2Tr(VV )
= 2Tr(x0 0 1j x) + 4
2Tr(x0 0Vx) + 2Tr(VV )
and
E()2 = (w0w)2 + Tr2(V ) + 2w0wTr(V )
= 4Tr2(x0 0x) + Tr2(V ) + 22Tr(x0 0x)Tr(V )
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Substituting back we have:
E[((qj   q)0(f   pr))2] = Tr(x0 0 1j x) + 4Tr(x0 0Vx) +
2
2
Tr(VV )
+ 2Tr2(x0 0x) +
1
2
Tr2(V ) + 2Tr(x0 0x)Tr(V ) (46)
Expected Utility From (9) in the main text, we know that expected utility is
U1j =
1
2
trace(^ 1j V ar[^j   pr]) +
1
2
E1[^j   pr]0^ 1j E1[^j   pr]
where we have normalized initial wealth W0 = 0. The excess return is given by:
^j   pr = ^j( 1+ 1j j) A Bf   Cx
The signal  can be expressed as the true asset payo f , plus orthogonal signal noise j .
^j   pr = ^j 1 A+ (^j 1j  B)f + ^j 1j j   Cx
Since  and A are known constants and f , j , and x are independent, with variances , j , and xI
respectively, the variance term is given by:
V ar[^j   pr] = (^j 1j  B)(^j 1j  B)0 + ^j 1j ^j + CC 0x
Substituting in for the price coecients using (20), (21), and (22) yields
V ar[^j   pr] = (  ^j) 1(  ^j)0 + ^j 1 ^j + 2x 
Next, work out the second term by using the expression above for ^j   pr and taking the expectation:
E[^j   pr] = ^j 1 A+(^j 1j  B). Substituting in the coecients A and B, and simplifying reveals
that E[^j   pr] = x. Thus,
E1[^j   pr]0^ 1j E1[^j   pr] = 2x0 ^ 1j x
Thus, expected utility is
U1j =
1
2
trace

^ 1j (  ^j) 1(  ^j)0 + 1j ^j + 2^ 1j x

+
2
2
x0 ^ 1j x
We can simplify the terms inside the trace to get the nal expression which is convenient for the following
proofs:
U1j =
1
2
trace

^ 1j [(
2xI +
 1)] + I   2 1 

+
2
2
x0 ^ 1j x (47)
or equivalently
U1j =
1
2
trace

^ 1j V + I   2 1 

+
2
2
x0 ^ 1j x (48)
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A.3 Lemma 2: Investors Prefer Not To Learn Price Information
The idea behind this result is that an investor who learns from price information, will infer that the asset is
valuable when its price is high and infer that the asset is less valuable when its price is low. Buying high and
selling low is generally not a way to earn high prots. This eect shows up as a positive correlation between
^ and pr, which reduces the variance V ar[^j   pr].
Mathematical Preliminaries: Note that B 1(pr   A) = f + B 1Cx. Since x is a mean-zero shock, this
is an unbiased signal about the true asset payo f . The precision of this signal is  1p   1x B0(CC 0) 1B.
Lemma 2. A manager who could choose either learning from prices and observing a signal ~jf  N(f; ~)
or not learning from prices and instead getting a higher-precision signal jf  N(f;), where the signals
are conditionally independent across agents, and where  1 = 
 1
p + ~
 1
 , would prefer not to learn from
prices.
Proof. From (9) in the main text, we know that expected utility is
U1j =
1
2
trace(^ 1j V ar[^j   pr]) +
1
2
E1[^j   pr]0^ 1j E1[^j   pr]
By Bayes' rule, the two options yield equally informative posterior beliefs: ^ 1j = 
 1+ 1 = 
 1+ 1p +
~ 1 . Likewise, since both possibilities give the manager unbiased signals, beliefs are a martingale, meaning
that E1[^j   pr], is identical under the two options.
Thus, the only term in expected utility that is aected by the decision to learn information from prices
is V ar[^j   pr]. Let ^j = E[f j] be the posterior expected value of payos for the manager who learns from
the conditionally independent signal and ~ = E[f jp; ~] the posterior expected value for the manager that
chooses to learn information in prices.
From properties of the variance we have that:
V ar[^j   pr]  V ar[~  pr] = V ar[^j ]  V ar[~] + 2(Cov[~; pr]  Cov[^j ; pr])
Step 1: show that the rst two terms are equal and thus cancel out. By Bayes' law: ^j = ^j(
 1+ 1j ).
Writing the signal as  = f +  (see Preliminaries) we have:
^j = ^j(
 1+ 1j f +
 1
j )
Then V ar[^j ] = ^j
 1
j (
 1
j + I)^j .
Again, by Bayes' law, ~ = ^j(
 1+ 1p B
 1(pr  A) + ~ 1 ~). Write the signal as ~ = f + ~ and use
the price equation pr = A+Bf + Cx we get:
~ = ^j(
 1+ 1p B
 1(Bf + Cx) + ~ 1 (f + ~))
= ^j(
 1+ ( 1p + ~
 1
 )f +
 1
p B
 1Cx+ ~ 1 ~)
= ^j(
 1+ 1 f +
 1
p B
 1Cx+ ~ 1 ~)
where the last equality comes from the assumption that ~ 1 +
 1
p = 
 1
 .
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Then taking variance:
V ar[~] = ^j(
 1
 
 1
 + x
 1
p B
 1CC 0B 1 1p + ~
 1
 ])^j
= ^j
 1
 (
 1
 + I)^j + x^j(
 1
p B
 1CC 0B 1 1p    1p )^j
= ^j
 1
 (
 1
 + I)^j + ^j
 1
p (xB
 1CC 0B 1 1p   I)^j
= ^j
 1
 (
 1
 + I)^j
where the last term cancels because  1p   1x B0(CC 0) 1B. Therefore, V ar[^j ] = V ar[~].
Step 2: Show that Cov[~; pr] > Cov[^j ; pr]. Now we compute the covariance terms, using the fact that
adding constant terms do not change change the value of the covariance.
Cov[^j ; pr] = Cov[^j   ^j( 1j + 1); pr  A]
= Cov[^j
 1
j (f   ) + ^j 1j ; B(f   ) + Cx]
= Cov[^j
 1
j (f   ); B(f   )]
= E[^j
 1
j (f   )(f   )0B0]
= ^j
 1
j B
0
Cov[~; pr] = Cov[~  ^j( 1 + 1); pr  A]
= Cov[^j
 1
j (f   ) + ^j 1p B 1Cx+ ^j ~ 1 ~; B(f   ) + Cx]
= Cov[^j
 1
j (f   ); B(f   )] + Cov[^j 1p B 1Cx;Cx]
= ^j
 1
j B
0 + E[^j 1p B
 1Cxx0C 0]
= ^j
 1
j B
0 + ^j 1p (
 1
x B
0(CC 0) 1B) 1B0
= Cov[^j ; pr] + ^jB
0
In summary, we have shown that V ar[^j   pr] V ar[~  pr] > 0. The dierence in utility from learning
conditionally independent information and learning price information is given by
1
2
trace(^ 1j (V ar[^j   pr]  [V ar[~  pr]))
Since the expression inside the trace is a product of positive denite matrices, the dierence in expected
utilities is positive.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
If (42) holds, then the marginal value of a given investor j reallocating an increment of capacity from stock-
specic shock i  f1; 2g to the aggregate shock is increasing in the aggregate shock variance a: If Kaj = ~K
and Kij = K   ~K, then @2U=@ ~K@a > 0.
Proof. We want to take a cross-partial derivative of utility with respect to a and ~K. To do this, we will
substitute out the ^ 1j terms using (27), (28), and (29). Then, we will use the fact that, by the chain rule,
@U=@ ~K = @U=@Kaj   @U=@Kij . Therefore,
@2U=@ ~K@a = @
2U=@Kaj@a   @2U=@Kij@a
We consider each of these two cross-partial derivatives separately in cases a and b.
Part a: The marginal value of a given investor j having additional capacity Kaj devoted to learning about
the aggregate shock a is increasing in the aggregate shock variance: @2U=@Kaj@a > 0.
Recall the expression for utility in (47):
U1j =
1
2
trace

^ 1j [(
2xI +
 1)] + I   2 1 

+
2
2
x0 ^ 1j x
Sign last term: 
2
2 x
0 ^ 1j x
Note that Kaj appears only in ^
 1
j . Recall that @^
 1
j =@^a
 1 = a. Since ^a 1 = a 1 + Kaj , the
chain rule implies that @^ 1j =@Kaj = a. Thus, the last term has Kaj derivative (
2=2)x0 a x. The only
term in this expression that varies in a is . Since  has every entry increasing in a (equation 31), and 
and a are positive semi-denite matrices, this term has a positive cross-partial derivative @
2=@Kj@a > 0.
One can also compute it analytically and obtain: 
2
2a(
 1
a + Ka)2
a xx
0 > 0. Thus, a sucient condition for
@2U=@Kj@a > 0 is for the trace term to have a positive cross partial derivative.
Sign trace: trace

^ 1j [(
2xI +
 1)] + I   2 1 

Observe that only the rst element of the trace depends on Kaj and exclusively through ^
 1
j . We take
derivative of the trace with respect to Kaj to get:
trace(a (
2xI +
 1))
Note from equation (39) that (2xI + 
 1) = V . We know that the derivative of V with respect
to a is positive if condition (42) holds. Since upa is invariant in a and is positive semidenite, the partial
derivative of the product is positive semidenite, and therefore the trace is  0 if (42) holds. Thus, (42) is
a sucient condition for the cross-partial to be positive.
Part b: The marginal value of a given investor j having additional capacity Kij devoted to learning about
stock-specic shock i is constant in the aggregate shock variance: @2U=@Kij@a = 0.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider reallocating capacity from the asset 1 shock to the aggregate
shock (i = 1). The same proof follows if it were asset 2 instead.
Sign last term: 
2
2 x
0 ^ 1j x.
Note that K1j appears only in ^
 1
j . Recall that @^
 1
j =@^1
 1 = 1. Since ^1 1 = 1 1 +K1j , using the
chain rule, we get @^ 1j =@K1j = 1. Therefore, @=@K1j(x
0 ^ 1j x) = x
0 1 x.
Because of the structure of the 1 matrix, it turns out that using (26) and (31) to multiply out the three
matrices 1  delivers
1  =
264 (
 1
1 +
K1)
 2 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
375 : (49)
Since this has no a term in it and both x and  are exogenous, the cross-partial derivative @
2=@K1j@a of
the last terms is zero.
Sign trace: trace

^ 1j [(
2xI +
 1)] + I   2 1 

Observe that only the rst element of the trace depends on K1j and exclusively through ^
 1
j . We take
derivative of the trace with respect to K1j to get:
trace(1 (
2xI +
 1))
From the multiplication above, we have that trace(1 ) = (
 1
1 +
K1)
 2. Also, the sparse form of 1
causes the matrix multiplication of 1 
 1 0 to turn out neatly. Using (23), (26) and (31) to multiply out
the four matrices delivers
1 
 1 0 =
264 
 1
1 (
 1
1 +
K1)
 2 0 0
0 0 0
 b1 11 ( 11 + K1) 2 0 0
375 : (50)
The trace of this matrix is  11 (
 1
1 +
K1)
 2. With these facts, the expression for @=@Kij can be rewritten as:
( 11 + K1)
2( 11 + x). Since this expression has no a term in it, the cross-partial derivative @
2=@K1j@a
is zero.
In conclusion, if Ka   1a then @2U=@Kaj@a > 0 and @2U=@Kij@a = 0 and the dierence of the
two terms is positive. Thus, if the average attention allocated to the aggregate shock is not too high, the
marginal value of a given investor j reallocating an increment of capacity from shock 1 to the aggregate
shock is increasing in the aggregate shock variance: @2U=@ ~K@a = @
2U=@Kaj@a   @2U=@Kij@a > 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
If the size of the composite asset x3 is suciently large, then an increase in risk aversion increases the
marginal utility of reallocating a unit of capacity from the idiosyncratic shock to the aggregate shock:
@=@(@U=@(Kaj  K1j) > 0.
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Proof. We can rewrite @=@(@U=@(^ 1aj   ^ 11j )) as @2U=@@^ 1aj   @2U=@@^ 11j > 0.
We will work out each of these two terms separately. But rst, both depend on the partial derivative of
utility with respect to risk aversion. Taking the partial derivative of utility in (47) with respect to  yields
@U
@
= xTr[^
 1
j
] + x0 ^ 1j x: (51)
The next step is to dierentiate (51) with respect to ^ 1aj . Since ^
 1
aj is the precision of agent j's
information, it does not aect aggregate variables such as . Recalling that @^ 1j =@^
 1
aj = a,
@2U
@@^ 1aj
= xTr[a ] + x
0 a x: (52)
Next, we follow the same steps to dierentiate (51) with respect to ^ 11j , which also aects only ^j .
Recalling that @^ 1j =@^
 1
1j = 1, and using the fact that the trace is invariant to matrix ordering,
@2U
@@^ 11j
= xTr[1 ] + x
0 1 x: (53)
The extent to which risk aversion aects the utility of reallocating precision from risk 1 to risk a is the
dierence of (52) and (53):
@=@(@U=@(^ 1aj   ^ 11j )) = xTr[(a  1)] + x0 (a  1)x: (54)
If b1 < 1, then a   1 =
264 1 0 b10 0 0
b1 0 1  b21
375 is positive denite. Since  is positive denite, both the
trade and the second term will be positive and we have the result.
We can derive a dierent sucient condition as follows. Multiplying out term-by-term a  reveals
that it equals 2abb
0. Multiplying out 1  reveals that it equals
1  =
264 
2
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
375
Thus,
Tr[(a  1)] = 2a(b21 + b22 + 1)  21
and
x0 (a  1)x = 2a(b1x1 + b2x2 + x3)2   x2121
If these two terms are positive, then @=@(@U=@(^ 1aj   ^ 11j )) > 0.
Note that the whole second partial derivative is increasing in x3, the supply of the composite asset:
@=@(@U=@(^ 1aj   ^ 11j )) = x(2a(b21 + b22 + 1)  21) + 2a(b1x1 + b2x2 + xc)2   x2121 (55)
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Thus, as long as the composite asset, meant to represent the entire market capitalization, aside from the
two assets 1 and 2, is large enough relative to assets 1 and 2, the cross-partial derivative will be positive.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
If (42) holds, then for given precisions of an investor j who is more informed than the average (i.e. for
xed Kaj > Ka and Kij > Ki for i 2 f1; 2g), an increase in aggregate risk a: a) increases the dispersion
of fund portfolios E[(qj   q)0(qj   q)] where q 
R
qjdj and b) increases the dispersion of funds' portfolio
returns E[((qj   q)0(f   pr))2].
Proof of Part a):
Proof. From equation (44) in the preliminaries, we know that portfolio dispersion is given by:
E[(qj   q)0(qj   q)] = 1
2
Tr(V) + Tr(x0x)
Now we take partial derivatives with respect to a.
Term 1: The rst term depends only on information choice variables. So, holding choices xed, the
partial derivative with respect to a is zero.
Term 2: Recall that   ^ 1j  () 1 depends only on information choices, which we hold xed, and thus
@Tr(V)=@a = Tr(
h
@V=@a
i
). Furthermore, if the posterior precision of the investor is higher than
the average,  is positive denite too. From the preliminaries we know that @V=@a is positive semi-denite
if condition (42) holds. Therefore, (42) is a sucient condition for the second term to be positive.
Term 3: The derivative of term 3 with respect to a is: Tr(x
0
h
@()=@a
i
x). This will be positive
if
h
@()=@a
i
is positive semi-denite. We have that  = ( 1a + Ka)
 2bb0bb0+2( 1a + Ka)
 1bb0+2
and thus the derivative with respect to a is: 2
 2
a (
 1
a + Ka)
 3bb0bb0 + 2 2a (
 1
a + Ka)
 2bb0 > 0.
In sum, all four terms in the expression for dispersion are increasing in a.
Proof of Part b):
Proof. From equation (46) in the preliminaries, we know that dispersion of portfolio returns is given by:
E[((qj   q)0(f   pr))2] = Tr(x0 0 1j x) + 2Tr2(x0 0x) + 4Tr(x0 0Vx)
+
2
2
Tr(VV ) +
1
2
Tr2(V ) + 2Tr(x0 0x)Tr(V )
Observe that  1j and  depend only on choice variables, which we hold xed. Also, every entry of 
is increasing in a. If condition (42) holds, @V=@a is a positive semi-denite matrix, which guarantees that
the whole expression is increasing in a.
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A.7 Proposition 4
If x is suciently high, then for given Kaj ;Kij 8j , an increase in risk aversion  increases the dispersion
of funds' portfolio returns E[((qj   q)0(f   pr))2].
Proof. From equation (46) in the preliminaries, we have that the dispersion of portfolio returns is given by:
E[((qj   q)0(f   pr))2] = Tr(x0 0 1j x) + 4Tr(x0 0Vx) +
2
2
Tr(VV )
+ 2Tr2(x0 0x) +
1
2
Tr2(V ) + 2Tr(x0 0x)Tr(V )
Taking derivatives with respect to  we get:
@E[((qj   q)0(f   pr))2]
@
= 4Tr(x0 0
@V
@
x) +
2
2
Tr
@(VV )
@

  4
3
Tr(VV )
+ 2Tr2(x0 0x) +
2
2
Tr(V )Tr


@V
@

  2
3
Tr2(V )
+ 2Tr(x0 0x)Tr


@V
@

Substitute (39) for V , @V@ = 2x
 and @(VV )@ = 4x
 1  + 432x:
= 8xTr(x
0 0x)| {z }
>0
+2Tr2(x0 0x)| {z }
>0
+4xTr(x
0 0x)Tr



| {z }
>0
+ Tr


h
42x 
4
3
 1 1
i


| {z }
I
+ 22xTr
2()  2
3
Tr2( 1 )| {z }
II
We need a condition such that I and II are positive and thus the derivative will be positive. For (I),
we need 42x  43 1 1, or
Tr((42xI   1  1 1 1))  0: (56)
For (II), we need 22xTr
2()  23Tr2( 1 ), or
Tr((2xI    1))  0: (57)
In both cases, if x is suciently high, the conditions are met.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
If (42) holds, then an increase in aggregate shock variance increases the dierence between an informed
investor expected certainty equivalent return and the expected certainty equivalent return of an uninformed
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investor: @(Uj   UU )=@a > 0.
Proof. From (48) we know that time-1 expected utility for an agent who has posterior belief precision ^ 1j
is given by
U1j =
1
2
trace

^ 1j V + I   2 1 

+
2
2
x0 ^ 1j x
Since the result is about the dierence in utility between an informed and an uninformed agent, who
has posterior belief precision ^j = , we take the dierence of these two expected utilities:
Uj   UU = 1
2
trace

[^ 1j    1]V

+
2
2
x0 [^ 1j    1]x
Recall that ^ 1j    1 =  1j , then:
Uj   UU = 1
2
trace
 
 1j V

+
2
2
x0  1j x
Since  1j is a choice variable it does not change in a. Therefore we have that the partial derivative of
the utility dierence with respect to a is:
@(Uj   UU )
@a
=
1
2
trace

 1j

@V
@a

+ 2trace

x0 1j

@ 
@a

x

Dierentiating (31) tells us that @ =@a is a positive scalar times bb
0, which is positive semi-denite.
If (42) holds, then @V=@a is also positive semi-denite. Therefore, both trace terms are positive and
@(Uj   UU )=@a > 0.
A.9 Proof of Corollary 1
If (42) holds, then for given precisions of an investor j who is more informed than the average (i.e. for
xed Kaj > Ka and Kij > Ki for i 2 f1; 2g strictly positive), an increase in aggregate risk a increases the
expected prot of an informed fund, E[(qj   q)0(f   pr)], where q 
R
qjdj.
Proof. From (45), the expected prots are given by:
E[(qj   q)0(f   pr)] = Tr(x0 x) + 1

Tr(V )
Then
@E[(qj   q)0(f   pr)]
@a
= 2Tr

x0

@ 
@a

x

+
1

Tr



@V
@a

> 0
since  =  1j   () 1 does not depend on a and both  and V are increasing in a as long as condition
(42) holds. The requirement that the investor is more informed than the average ensures that  is positive
semi-denite.
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A.10 Proposition 6
For given Kaj ;K1j ;K2j strictly positive, an increase in risk aversion  for all investors increases the
dierence in expected certainty equivalent returns between an informed and an uninformed investor: @(Uj  
UU )=@ > 0.
Proof. From the proof of proposition (5) we have that the dierence in expected utilities between an informed
investor and an uninformed investors is:
Uj   UU = 1
2
Tr(^ 1j (  ^j) 1(  ^j)0) 
1
2
Tr
 
 1(  ) 1(  )0
+
1
2
Tr( 1j ^j) +
2
2
n
xTr(
 1
j
) + x0  1j x
o
where  1j = ^
 1
j    1. Dierentiating with respect to  yields:
@(Uj   UU )
@
= 
n
xTr(
 1
j
) + x0  1j x
o
As long as Kaj ;Kij are strictly positive, then j and its inverse will be a positive denite matrices. Since
 is clearly positive denite, we obtain the desired result.
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